Bo's Memoir

"War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things. The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks nothing is worth war is much worse. The person who has nothing for which he is wiling to fight, nothing that is more important than his own personal safety, is a miserable creature and has no chance of being free unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself."

John Stuart Mill

Bo's Memoir Introduction

I've spent a lot of time during the last few weeks updating my chapter about VA-15 Circa 1967 adding missions of my squadron mates to the time line. The missions provide a better understanding of the history of our deployment by adding dates, targets, size and composition of the strike groups, defenses encountered and other important details. I will be continuing this effort or the next month or so.

VA-15 (1967) Second USS Intrepid Second Vietnam Deployment Yankee Station

(Rolling Thunder air operations over North Vietnam including "Iron Hand" Anti-SAM flights and Alpha Strikes)

Please remember that this memoir was originally written as a legacy for my family. As a result, it is a bit egocentric as it documents my
life's activities and adventures. But, it has also become a record or history from my perspective of the squadrons, staffs, and ships for the period of time that I was stationed with them. Writing this memoir has required a lot of research, reflection, and reestablishing contacts with former shipmates.

I had significant flight time in eleven types of aircraft during my flying career.

This poster was created by Ray Thomas Captain USN Ret, a VA-82 squadron mate.

I flew the four aircraft with the red tails during flight training; the T-34 at Saufley Field for primary flight training, the T2A at NAS Meridian and NAS Pensacola for basic jet training, and the TF9 and AF9 (not pictured) cougar and F-11 Tiger at NAS Kingsville in Advanced jet training. I was awarded my "Navy Wings of Gold" in February, 1965. I flew the A4 Skyhawk in VA-15 at NAS Cecil Field and on two Vietnam deployments aboard USS Intrepid CV-11 from 1965 through December, 1967. I flew the AT-33 (not pictured) and F-105 Thunderchief in the 4519 Combat Crew Training Squadron at McConnell Air Force Base in Wichita, Kansas and had a 34 flight our checkout in the F4 Phantom at Davis Monthan AFB in Tuscon, Arizona from 1968 through 1970. After checking out in the A7 aircraft in replacement pilot training, I flew the A7E Corsair in VA-82 at NAS Cecil Field in Jacksonville Florida with one Mediterranean cruise in 1971 and my third Vietnam deployment 1972 aboard the USS America CV-66 fling the A7C. I flew my second tour in the A7E in VA-15 at Cecil Field with one Mediterranean cruise in 1977. I was the Commanding Officer of VA-15 from Dec 1977 through April 1979. We were recognized as the best Light Attack Squadron on the East Coast with the Battle "E" during that tour. My third A7 tour was as the Commanding Officer of the VA-174 Hellrazors at Cecil. VA-174 was the replacement pilot squadron and had over 1000 sailors and 100 aircraft. I flew my 2,000 flight hour in the A7B/C/E and the TA7C during that tour and recorded my 500th carrier arrested landing (trap) on the USS America during that tour!

I have recently read a book "Dead Men Flying" written by Mike "Mule" Mullhane. "Mule" was a JO (Junior Officer) who flew his "nugget" cruise (first cruise) flying A4Es from USS Oriskany as a member of the VA-164 "Ghost Riders" of CAG 16 ("Bloody Sixteen").

I think that it is of value to compare his experiences with our experiences as JOs in VA-15 during our deployment to the Tonkin Gulf during the same period during the summer and fall of 1967.

There are important differences to consider; "Mule" checked in to VA-164 during the turnaround from their previous deployment in the summer of 1966 where the squadron lost eight pilots; two were KIA (Killed in Action), one was shot down and captured (POW), one was killed in an operational accident, and four died in the terrible fire on board Oriskany which ended their deployment. There were only two JOs from the previous deployment in the ready room when "Mule" checked in. In our case, we had 10 JO's who were "hand picked" from the RAG (Replacement Training Squadron) by LCDR Jerry Tuttle in 1965 as first tour pilots for our 1966 Vietnam deployment. All 10 of these JOs completed that deployment had over 100 missions before our 1967 deployment.

Another difference was that VA-164 had A4Es which had five weapons capable stations to our three stations on our A4Cs. This difference is significant as both squadrons were the designated Iron Hand (Anti SAM) squadrons in our respective air wings. VA-164 A4Es could carry twice as many AGM-45 Anti Radiation SAM Missiles as our A4Cs. This affected our tactics. Another difference was that in VA-164's case their Iron Hand section consisted of one A4E Shrike capable aircraft escorted by an F8 Crusader. In our case, both Iron Hand aircraft were A4C Shrike shooters. Both squadrons carried either Mk82 500# bombs or 5 inch Zuni rockets in addition to the AGM 45 Shrikes. The F8 Crusader escort with the VA-164 Iron Hand aircraft from Oriskany was most likely a factor in CTF 70 assigning Iron Hand aircraft close to the active MIG bases in the Hanoi area.

The Tactical Aircraft Deckloads Were Also Different

                            CVW-16/USS Oriskany CVA-34            CVW-10/USS Intrepid CVA-11

VF-111 F8C Crusader fighters    One F8 VF-111 Det (4 aircraft)
                        VF-162 F8E Crusader attack squadron         VSF 3 A4C (14 aircraft)
                              VA-163 A4E (14 aircraft)                  VA-34 A4C (14 aircraft)
                              VA-164 A4E (14 aircraft)                  VA-15 A4C (14 aircraft)
                             VA-152 A1 Spads                            VA-145 A1 Spads
Both air wings had a similar array of photo Reconnaissance F8 Crusader aircraft, AEW (Airborne Early Warning) aircraft, and EW (Electronic Warfare) aircraft.

The enroute altitudes used by strike aircraft in each air wing were different; in CAG 16's case, 10,000 to 13,000 feet in our case 15,000 to 18,000 feet. One other important similarity is that neither CAG 16 on Oriskany nor CAG 10 on Intrepid had any F4 Phantom aircraft. We both had F8C Crusader aircraft that could not be used for BARCAP or MIGCAP missions and were only used for TARCAP or ESCORT missions. We were both dependent on the third Tonkin Gulf carrier; either Coral Sea or Constellation for F4 BARCAP/MIGCAP support.

I am particularly interested in what factors affected how our air wings were employed by CTF 70 and how much that affected our loss rates. Oriskany/CAG 16 lost 30 pilots either KIA (Killed in Action) or MIA (Missing in Action) during their 1967 deployment. Intrepid/CAG 10 lost half that many, Oriskany/CAG 16 also lost numerous aircraft and some pilots due to operational accidents especially "cold Cat shots". Intrepid/CAG-10 did not experience any catapult problems. Peter Fey lists all of Oriskany's combat and operational losses by date in his book, "Bloody Sixteen". I have used those data to to determine what we were doing on the same dates. "Mule" describes Oriskany's his missions by date in his book DMF so I am using some of that information also in comparing our operations.

I the Vietnam portion of the memoir below, There are detailed "journal" a style chapters of theses two deployments complete with combat charts, photographs, mission descriptions and even port visits.

When I flew my Vietnam combat missions, my only concerns were to fly the flight schedule and be an effective combat pilot. The political aspects of the war were not part of my concerns. However, writing my memoir has involved reading numerous accounts of the air war in Vietnam including research in how the political aspects of the war affected our effectiveness thus changing my Memoir in to part journal, part analysis. I used green text to indicate the political stuff. One of the most obvious political factors which affected our ability to effectively do our job was that President Johnson and Secretary of State Robert McNamara micro managed the war (on Tuesday's over lunch) rather than let the senior flag officers of the respective services do theirs.

Three factors which proved to be detrimental to effectively fight the air war over North Vietnam during Operation Rolling Thunder

1. No strike circles around Hanoi and Haiphong at the beginning of Rolling Thunder in 1966
2. Strike restrictions on SAM sites which were under construction and airfields. Johnson/McNamara didn't want to risk killing any Russian advisors at these sites! (Really YGTBSM!)
3. Micromanaged major target strike selection rather than let the Air Force and Navy select targets in their assigned areas (Air Force Route pacts 1, 5, 5B, 6A; Navy Route Packages 2, 3, 4, 6B) and coordinate strikes in Hanoi and Haiphong.

I will use the navy blue text for the material which is related to items of fact or personal observation. I should note that all three of my Vietnam deployments were during the summer monsoon season which featured the best flying weather and consequently the most intense portions of the air war over the north.

Note: As I mentioned above, most pilots flying missions over North Vietnam during Operation Rolling Thunder (1965-1968) and Linebacker 1 in 1972 flew the flight schedule without considering the international political factors involved or the military political factors such as target assignment to the carriers involved or the subject of medal awards associated with the more "unusual" missions. I will address both these "military" political factors in the Chapter about my VA-15 1967 deployment!

In addition to my own recollections and my flight log book, I am using information provided by my squadron mates, then Google and Wikipedia as external sources while writing this memoir. I have also read numerous books about Rolling Thunder (1965-1968), Linebacker One and Two (1972), and about VAL 4 and the OV-10 close air support operations in the Mekong Delta.

Vietnam:

Operation Rolling Thunder (1965-1968)- The VALions of VA-15, USS Intrepid (CVS-11):

Operation Rolling Thunder prior to our arrival on Yankee Station consisted of limited and restricted offensive air operations targeting lines of communication; roads and bridges. The Thanh Hoa bridge was attacked for the first time on April 3rd, 1965 resulting in the loss of two F-105s.During the summer of 1965, restricted and prohibited areas around Hanoi and Haiphong as well as the buffer zone along the Chinese border were established. At some point, airfields and SAM sites under construction were off limits due to the fear that killing Russians who were conducting training in those locations might widen the war. Prior to our arrival on Yankee Station, authority to attack the POL system was given.
(Information in this paragraph was taken from Appendix 4 of Peter Fey's book "Bloody Sixteen")

I completed over 200 Vietnam combat missions in Vietnam in 1966 and 1967. My first deployment as a"nugget" pilot in VA-15 was a Vietnam combat deployment! We deployed aboard USS Intrepid (CVS-11), a World War II vintage aircraft carrier which had been converted from the Anti Submarine Warfare mission (CVS) to conduct Close and Direct air support missions from Dixie Station off the coast of South Vietnam. Intrepid's Carrier Air Wing Ten had two A4B squadrons with 16 A4B aircraft each and two Spad squadrons to accomplish the Dixie Station mission. We normally flew two combat flights a day working with Forward Air Controllers in support of ground operations in the Mekong Delta to areas northwest and east of Saigon. But, President Johnson wanted to increase the sorties from Yankee Station over north Vietnam that required a third carrier on Yankee Station. So, during our second line period on Dixie Station, we were ordered north to Yankee Station to participate in Operation Rolling Thunder 51. Authorized missions during this phase of Rolling Thunder were armed reconnaissance of most of North Vietnam except for the restricted areas around Hanoi and Haiphong. In addition to POL storage areas, an emphasis for this portion of Rolling Thunder was bridges and the northeast rail line.
(Information in this paragraph was taken from Appendix 4 of Peter Fey's book "Bloody Sixteen")

It was tricky business operating an aircraft carrier specifically designed for close air support in a low threat area; no fighters (VF), no electronic warfare (EW) or air control aircraft (AEW) in the air wing in the high threat environment of North Vietnam. Our A4B aircraft were not equipped with adequate electronic warfare equipment and were only marginally effective at night. As a result, we flew only day missions which at first were confined to the lower threat coastal areas from south of Vinh to south of Thanh Hoa. However, as we gained experience, we flew missions from Thanh Hoa to Haiphong and occasionally further inland with fighter support from another aircraft carrier that had F4 Phantoms for BARCAP/MIGCAP missions.

VA-15 (1965-1966) First USS Intrepid Vietnam Deployment Dixie/Yankee Station

(South Vietnam Close and Direct Air Support and Rolling Thunder air operations over North Vietnam)

Eight months later, on June 21st, 1967, we were back on Yankee Station!

During this portion of Operation Rolling Thunder, selected targets were authorized for strike within the 10 mile circle around Hanoi. This included the airfields at Kep and Hoa Lac, the power transformer in the center of Hanoi, and other industrial targets in the city. Good weather permitted maximum effort against all targets. A concentrated effort was made to isolate supply lines connecting Hanoi and Haiphong to communist China with the overall purpose of isolating Hanoi and Haiphong from the rest of North Vietnam. *See Note
The summer of 1967 resulted in the heaviest bombing of North Vietnam during Operation Rolling Thunder.
Information in this paragraph was taken from Appendix 4 of Peter Fey's book "Bloody Sixteen")

* Note: The CVA 11/CAG 10 team was tasked to fly numerous missions against the Hai Duong Railroad/Highway bridge located between Hanoi and Haiphong as an integral part of this strategy!

USS Intrepid and a CAG-10 deck load from bases on both costs; In addition to VA-15, Intrepid's deck load included VA-34 from Cecil Field and VSF-3 from NAS Alemeda. along with a west coast Spad squadron, VA-145 from Alameda. Our CAG 10 airwing had a detachment of four F8 Crusader fighter aircraft for strike escort (VF 111 Det 11) and and a few RF-8 reconnaissance aircraft (VFP Det 11) both from Miramar , EW (Electronic Warfare) support aircraft from VAQ-33 from NAS Jacksonville, and AEW (airborne early warning aircraft) from VAW 1121 from NAS Norfolk. Our

Our F-8 Crusader fighter aircraft would be limited to providing TARCAP fighter coverage for our strike air craft and escort for our RF8 reconnaissance aircraft. Barrier Combat Air Patrol (MIGCAP) missions for our strikes would be provided by F4s from the USS Constellation or USS Coral Sea. This time though, we were not the "new guys". We returned with a different CO and XO, but most of the pilots from the first cruise were back and only a couple of "new guys" to break in. We had turned in our 16 A4Bs for 14 A4C Skyhawks properly fitted out with EW gear. During the turnaround training cycle, we received extensive training in the Russian made AAA and SA-2 Guideline defense systems as we were assigned as the air wing squadron dedicated to fly missions against the SA-2 missile system radars, called Iron Hand missions.This time, we would be "in the thick of it" from the start. We were ready and would prove that the USS Intrepid small deck carrier could provide effective air to ground attack missions as well as or better than, the large deck carriers (We had more A4s in our deck load than the larger aircraft carriers).

VA-15 (1967) Second USS Intrepid Second Vietnam Deployment Yankee Station

(Rolling Thunder air operations over North Vietnam including "Iron Hand" Anti-SAM flights and Alpha Strikes)

I have pretty much completed my comparison between Oriskany and Intrepid during the summer and fall of 1967 (Operation Rolling Thunder 57)

So far, these are my conclusions:

It is important to remember that the overall strategy of Rolling Thunder 57 was to isolate Hanoi from Hai Phong by interdicting the lines of communications between the two, to lift the restrictions on attacking airfields, and to target industrial targets in downtown Hanoi. CTF 70 chose to use Oriskany's Air Wing 16 for attacks on Hanoi targets and to use Intrepid's Air Wing 10 to interdict key lines of communications between Hanoi and Hai Phong, especially the key target of the Hai Duong railroad/highway bridge between the two.

In my opinion,

1. The primary reasons CVW 16 was selected for Hanoi area strikes is that their Iron Hand A4E's were capable of carrying more Shrike missiles than Intrepid's A4Cs and that each CVW 16 Iron Hand aircraft was escorted by an F8 Crusader which was an important advantage with the increased MIG threat in the Hanoi area.

2. For the strike on the Hanoi Thermal Power Plant, Oriskany's VA-163 was well trained in the use of the TV guided walleye weapon to be used in that strike.

However, CVW-10 was actually capable of providing more strike group aircraft including delivering more MK 80 series bombs on a major target than CVW-16. CVW-10 had three A4C squadrons to two for CVW-16. Note; Mule Mullane points out in his book DMF that due to combat and operational losses, there were times that Oriskany could only produce 12 A4E bomber aircraft. CVW-10 routinely produced 20 A4C bombers (6 from VA-15, 6 from VA-34, and 8 from VSF-3) in addition to 4-6 Iron Hand aircraft from VA-15 and 4 Flak suppressor aircraft from VA-34. So, in my opinion the greater bombing capacity was better utilized against the key target of the Hai Duong railroad/highway bridge.

Oriskany's higher pilot loss rate than Intrepid: It has been argued that Oriskany's higher loss rate can be attributed to flying more strikes in the Hanoi area. If you check out the loss rates in provided Peter Fey in "Bloody 16" and documented in my Chapter VA-15 1967 Vietnam Deployment, you will discover that CVW-16 lost 5 of their 33 pilot in their high profile Hanoi strikes. The rest of Oriskany's pilot losses (28) were on missions flown by both air wings such as Armed Recce missions, division level strikes against small bridges, and strikes against Vinh, Thanh Hoa, Nam Dinh, Ninh Bin, Phu Ly and Hai Phong. Intrepid lost a third as many pilots doing the same missions.

Why did Oriskany have a higher pilot loss rate flying similar missions than Intrepid: Some observers have suggested that Oriskany's CVW-16 planners did not have much confidence in their EW equipment so chose to keep the same medium enroute altitudes they used in their 1966 deployment. However, Mule Mullane spoke with confidence in his book DMF about the effectiveness their EW equipment. Whatever the reason, CVW-16 choose to use medium altitudes (10,000-12,000 feet) which put them in range of 37mm barrage fire and 57mm/85mm aimed fire. CVW-10 decided to use a higher enroute altitude of about 18,000 feet which eliminated the threat of 37/57 barrage fire. Our EW equipment plus mild jinking was effective against 85mm aimed fire leaving only MIGS and SAMs to worry about. In my opinion Oriskany's decision to use the lower enroute altitude and resultant lower roll in altitude was a factor in their higher loss rates!

Operation Linebacker 1 and 2 (summer/fall 1972): The Marauders of VA-82, USS America (CVA-66):

I completed close to 100 combat missions flying the A7C Corsair with the Marauders of VA-82 from the deck of USS America (CV-66) during the summer and fall of 1972. At the beginning of writing this chapter, I remembered very little about that cruise; my third Vietnam tour. But I was able to seek out and reestablish contact with some of my VA-82 Marauder squadron mates; RADM J. Breast, ADM Leighton "Snuffy" Smith, Captain Tom Scott, Jim "Rock" Yeager, Ray Thomas, Charlie Sapp, Jim Kuzmick, Ron Brooks, Marv Baldwin, Gary Tabbert, Terry Ede, Jim Brister, and Nick Nickens, to get their views and comments on some of the missions. I have been able to reconstruct that deployment in some detail. I was able to write up a detailed description of the Battle of Mo Duc which took place on September 17th, 1972, a "Pocket Money" mining mission we (me, Rock, and Ray Thomas) flew near Hon Gay on October 4th, and a major strike mission I lead against the Do Xa bridge near Hanoi on October 5th with "Rock", Dan Ryder, and Ray Thomas. The mission to Hanoi features a two minute audio tape of a salvo of three SA-2 surface to air missiles directed at our division just prior to our arrival in the target area..

VA-82 USS America Vietnam Deployment-1972 Yankee Station

(Linebacker One air operations over North Vietnam including "Pocket Money" anti-ship mining operations and close air support missions in northern South Vietnam during the bombing halt in North Vietnam between Linebacker One and Linebacker Two)

Books about fighting the Vietnam War in the Mekong Delta in 1969

It turned out that before reporting to VA-82, Charlie Sapp had a tour of duty in 1969 flying OV-10 Broncos with Light Attack Squadron four (VAL-4) in the Mekong Delta. This mission of VAL 4 was to provide close air support for US Navy River Patrol Boats and Navy Seals various other ground forces when possible. I found that Charlie's stories were very interesting and included some of them the chapter about the VA-82 deployment in the summer of 1972. I recommend you read "Flying Black Ponies" written by Kit Lavell.

You will enjoy learning about the significant role the OV-10 made in operations in the Mekong Delta.

You will also enjoy reading David Donovan's book about his experiences as the Military Assistance Team (MAT) 32 Commanding Officer in the Ding Tien District Mekong Delta near the Cambodian border in 1969. The mission of MAT teams was to act as advisors for local Vietnamese forces about how to defend themselves in counter guerilla operations and to provide assistance for local construction or repair projects for schools and other local needs.

To accomplish these challenging missions MAT teams consisted usually of only five US Army soldiers:
Two officers (a Captain and a 1st Lieutenant) with combat arms backgrounds, two Non Commissioned Officers (NCO) with combat arms background (one heavy weapons and one light weapons expert), and a Medic.

Click on Vietnam Bibliography for a current list of some other books I have read while writing the chapters about the air war over Vietnam.

I conducted research to understand the political roles that President Lyndon Johnson played in Operation Rolling Thunder (1965-1968) and President Richard Nixon played in Operations Linebacker One and Two (1972).

o really understand President Johnson's life and political motivation, it is helpful to read all four volumes of Robert Cato's biography of Lyndon Johnson.
Volume 1. Johnson's early years growing up in the high country of Texas.
Volume 2. Johnson's life as a Congressman and his relationship with Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn
Volume 3. Johnson's life as a Senator and his relationship with Senator Richard Russell.

Volume 4. "The Passage of Power". President Johnson's goal of passing "Great Society" legislation and his difficulty in coming to terms with his role as Commander in Chief for the Vietnam war.

To best understand President Richard Nixon's role as Commander in Chief during the Vietnam war, I chose to review it through the eyes of his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger in his book "The White House Years".

President Nixon understood that the way to limit Russian and Chinese support to North Vietnam was through bilateral negotiations with Russia through things like the SALT talks and through Nixon's eventual expansion of our relations with China with his visit to China in May,1972.

Politics was not a significant factor in my childhood, my time at Cornell, or during the training command when I was in pursuit of my Navy "wings of gold". There were some political events during those periods in my life that were significant such as the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962 and the assassination of John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Texas on November 22nd, 1963. I will be adding my comments about how these events affected me in the relevant chapters.

As I am writing this in some cases almost sixty years after the events occurred, the dates and places are the best I can remember or document in some way. My flight log book provided excellent accurate information in this regard. I am learning that memories that seem clear to me and my friends are not necessarily accurate concerning the place or time that they occurred.

PTSD

During the process of writing this memoir, I have come to believe that the emotional stress I experienced over the skies of North Vietnam during my three deployments particularly after loosing one of my good friends, PC Craig on July 4th, 1967 and during all of the Operation Linebacker 1 during the summer and fall of 1972 resulted in a type of mild but significant variety of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) known as "emotional numbness" (The inability to grieve/survivor's guilt). All good carrier combat pilots have to have the ability to compartmentalize; focusing only on the business at hand in order to properly fly the aircraft. This is particularly critical when experiencing inflight emergencies as an incorrect action can cause the loss of the aircraft and possibly the life of the pilot. In combat, it also became necessary to put off grieving for someone who has just been lost in order to continue to fly the mission in progress or the next mission after that. After awhile, you may be unable to outwardly display grief at all. An advantage of this "emotional numbness" is that it is easier to concentrate on those things you can control and ignore those that you cannot. I think that the losses we experienced during my 1967 Vietnam deployment significantly affected my third Vietnam deployment with VA-82. Although I didn't recognize it at the time, I was not more cautious; exactly the opposite. I adopted a "warrior mentality"I thought being aggressive and unpredictable increased my chances of survival. I focused on the missions and was somewhat emotionally detached from my fellow Marauder pilots lest I should loose one of them. After I flew a mission, I put it out of my mind, got ready for the next mission then forgot about that one and prepared for the next day etc. I think that why I had very little memory about that deployment except for our liberty visit to Singapore where the wives joined us! I didn't remember any of the combat related stuff until I reconnected with my VA-82 shipmates while writing this memoir.

This is a relevant excerpt from Mike Spencer's book, "One Man's Journey: The Life, Lessons & Legacy of a World War II Fighter Pilot"

After a pilot was short down, "we all gathered in the tent and had a drink in his honor. ..The next morning, life went on as though he hadn't been there at all. That's the way it had to be. ....Fighter pilots by the nature of their jobs need to show little emotion. ... If a pilot were shot down, we didn't say, "Oh how awful. I feel sorry for him". No, instead we went out and tried to kill the guy who shot him, and then we went on with our lives...My lack of emotion sometimes surprised me, but I suppose that was how I coped with the reality of war.

I've read the writings of many philosophers, and several have alluded to the idea that strong people don't get too involved in things over which we have no control. That's the feeling I had about fighter pilots."

from page 144

So, far, I have read two memoirs written by pilots who flew missions in Europe during World War Two (WW2). One was a B-16 bomber pilot who was shot down over France and spent four months with the French resistance forces which helped him escape (LtCol James Armstrong ASAFR Ret. "Escape: An American Airman's Escape from Hitler's Fortress Europe", 2000). I was able to talk with Jim on a Sunday afternoon in Thomasville, GA. The second was written by a P47 "Thunderbolt" pilot (Mike Spencer, "One Man's Journey", 2018) who flew missions over France and Germany in 1944 and 1945. His Thunderbolt squadron flew primarily air to ground missions. I heard Mike speak at an luncheon of Jacksonville's Bald Eagle Squadron which is a local part of the national of Association of Naval Aviation luncheon.

After I read his book, I contacted him and we had lunch. I asked many questions about his combat experiences. We also discussed the process he used to work with a co-author (Kenneth R. Overman) to get his book published. First, I learned that working with a co-author/publisher package cost about $5000. The writing process involved Mike recording his story and then the co-author wrote the draft for Mike to edit, I decided to publish it online as part of my personal website. Besides being a much cheaper option, good aspects of putting it online are that you can include many more pictures that in a published book and it is a living document and people who read it can correct any errors in content and make suggestions for any additions they might have.

I want your inputs such as events I have omitted or mistakes in fact that I have made. I'm not asking you to point out misspellings, typos, or grammatical errors. I hope you will and let me know your suggestions by email at:

bo_smith@bellsouth.net

My objective in writing this memoir is to reflect upon my life and lessons learned in the process of living it and to provide a historical record for my children and my Navy shipmates. I am also enjoying the challenge of writing it. Conducting the research online, reading relevant books, and providing factual information from my flight log book has required some effort but has been enjoyable. I also have liked the increased contacts I am experiencing with my Navy friends as I seek their comments on my memoir including war stories of their experiences.

Childhood through High School (1941-1959)	Cornell University (1959-1963)	Navy Flight Training (1963-1965)
Maintenance Officer's School Memphis VA-45 and VA-44 NAS Cecil Field, Jacksonville (February 1965-October 1965)	VA-15 (1965-1966) First Vietnam Deployment USS Intrepid CVS-11 Dixie Station/Yankee Station (109 combat missions) (June 1966- October 1966)	VA-15 (1967) Second Vietnam Deployment USS Intrepid CVA-11 Yankee Station, Tonkin Gulf (94 combat missions- total 203) 300 Total Intrepid Traps (November 1966-November 1967)
US Air Force Exchange Tour AT-33 Instructor/F4 Phantom/ F105 Thunderchief Instructor Pilot McConnell AFB, Wichita, Kansas (March 1968-March 1970)	VA-82 A7 Corsair Tour-1971 1971 Mediterranean Cruise (July 1971-December 1971) USS America CV-66	VA-82 A7 Corsair Tour-1972 Third Vietnam Combat Deployment Yankee Station, Tonkin Gulf (June 1972-December 1972) (102 combat missions) USS America CV-66
Royal Air Force Staff College Bracknell, Barkshire, England (January 1973-February 1974)	COMNAVAIRLANT Staff Tour Norfolk, Virginia (March 1974- February 1976) A7 Class Desk Officer Aide and Flag Lieutenant	VA-15 Executive Officer Commanding Officer (1976-1979) USS America CV-66 Med Deployment (Dec 1977-April 1979) COMNAVAIRLANT Battle "E"
COMTHIRDFLEET Staff Tour Ford Island, Oahu, Hawaii Air Training Officer (May 1979-December, 1980) Planned and flew in Battle Group Hawaiian transit exercises, two Eastern Pacific Fleet Exercises, and a RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) Exercise	Commanding Officer VA-174 NAS Cecil Field Jacksonville, Florida (March 1981-July,1982) Completed the Surface Warfare Prospective Commanding Officer Course, SWOSCOLCOM, Newport (July,1982- October,1982)	Interim Commanding Officer FACSFAC Jacksonville (October 9th, 1982-June 9th, 1983) Continued deep draft ship training program on TAD basis Idaho Falls Ship Material Course (Feb1984-May 1984) Completed deep draft ship training program SWOSCOLCOM, Newport
Executive Officer USS Saratoga (CV-60) Med Deployment (1984)	Commanding Officer USS Austin (LPD-4) (July1985-July 1987) Med Deployment-May 85-Nov 85 Northern Wedding/Med Deployment (1986-1987)	Chief of Staff COMCRUDESGROUP 12 USS Eisenhower CV-69 Deployment (1989)
COMFAIRWESTPAC Operations Officer COMORANGE- 7th Fleet Atsugi, Japan (1990-1991) Special Assignment Desert Shield (Aug-Sep 1990)	Retired as Captain US Navy July 31st, 1991 Total Tactical Jet Hours- 4060 Total CV Landings- 980 Total Combat Missions- 305 Nine Deployments	Educator (1991-2007) Terry Parker High School University of North Florida Program Manager, Protein Crystals in Space in Florida Schools Florida Space Research Institute (Aerospace Education Mentor)