VA-82 Marauders- 1972
Vietnam Deployment

  January 1972- December 1972

(Updated November 1st, 2021)






Image produced by Ray Thomas


We took a break for the holidays after the fly in from our Med cruise on December 15th, 1971.

Heather (8), Laura (6)

It was wonderful to spend some time with our families. I especially enjoyed seeing my 5 month old daughter Stacy
for the first time and having our entire family together.

I think we made a Christmas trip to New Jersey and Duxbury and then returned to Jacksonville in early January.


January, 1972

I flew 14 flights in January (25.7 total jet hours) (18.8 A7E hours)
Ten of these were A7 flights with VA-82, mostly instrument flights including some night time.
 



Four of the flights were instrument flights in the TA-4 flights with VA-45
(6.9 TA-4 hours)




We had a lot of pilot changes at the end of the Med cruise after we got back.

VA-82 Officers March, 1972

We added three new pilots in March; Lt Dan Rather, the CAG 8 LSO would fly regularly, LT Bob Corey, and Ltjg Steve Musselman joined us from the RAG.
We now had our complement of 18 squadron pilots and one pilot who would fly with us regularly from at Air Wing.


Top Row (left to Right): WO1 John Young, LT Phil Morris, Ltjg Tom Weiland, LTjg Steve Musselman, LT Bob Corey, LT Craig "Crash" Landon, LT Ray Thomas,  LTjg Marv Baldwin,
LTjg Jim Kuzmick, LT Ron Brooks, Ltjg Jim Brister, LT Dan Ryder (CAG 8 LSO), Ens Nick Nickens and CWO2 Hal Garrett
Front Row: LT Jim "Rock" Yeager, LT Gary Tabbert, LCDR Bruce Page, me, CDR Don Sumner (CO), CDR Tom Scott (XO), LCDR Leighton "Snuffy" Smith, LCDR Al Miller, LT Charlie Sapp



We had 18 pilots assigned to the squadron and Lt Dan Rather who was the CAG 8 LSO and flew regularly with us.

We had a"brand new" Air Intelligence Officer, Ens Strain who I almost never saw because he was basically assigned to the CAG Eight.
We had no dedicated Flight Surgeon as by then he flight surgeons were attached to the airwing.

My key Maintenance Officers were:

Lt Phil Morris (Maintenance Control), Ens Nick Nickens (Mintenance/Material Officer), and AVCM Jim Moorehead (Maintenance Control Chief)*

*Master Chief Moorehead was the finest Maintenance Control Chief I served with during my Navy career!

We had two Warrant Officers in Maintenance supervisory positions; CWO2 Hal Garrett and WO1 John Young


February, 1972

I flew only 8 flights in January (12.1 A7E hours)

Most of the flights seem to be instrument or basic formation flights; all day flights. There are no indications that any of these were weapons flights.
I can only guess that we were at the bottom of the "totem pole" for fuel money and were saving fuel dollars for March to get ready for type training on the America in April.


We had some challenges ahead of us to get ready for type training.

Of course both the CO and XO were experienced carrier jet pilots. I don't know whether Don Sumner had any Vietnam combat experience but CDR Scott did flying A4 Skyhawks with VA-195 "Dambusters" on the "Bonnie Dick" AKA, the Bonne Home Richard CV-31 in 1965 and with the VA-113 "Stingers" on USS Kitty Hawk in 1966.

Snuffy and I were the only qualified combat strike leaders in the second tour group. The other two LCDRs, Bruce Page and Al Miller were experienced pilots but without any combat experience. LT Charlie Sapp had just completed jet transition training but had a combat tour with Light Attack Squadron Four VAL-4 flying OV-10s in the Mekong Delta. Charlie had over 200 close air support missions in VAL-4.

Three of our second tour JOs from the Med cruise; Ray Thomas, Rock Yeager and Gary Tabbert were strong.  A new pilot, Crash Landon had flown F8 Crusaders in a VC squadron so was an relatively experienced pilot but without much carrier operational experience.



President Nixon's Visit to China from February 21st through the 28th,1972

President Nixon's visit to China changed the balance of power in Asia. China was less interested in helping out their neighbor to the south and more interested in not jeopardizing their improving relationship with the USA. President Nixon left the visit confident that China would not intervene if the US decided to increase the bombing of North Vietnam. The tide had turned completely from a President and Secretary of Defense who were afraid to apply too much military pressure on North Vietnam for fear of China entering the war (Johnson and MacNamara) to a President and his National Security Advisor who were not afraid to turn up the pressure on North Vietnam (Nixon and Kissinger).


President and Mrs. Nixon are met by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai upon their arrival in Beijing.



March, 1972

I flew 16 flights in March (27.0 A7E hours)


From the beginning of March through March 21st we continued with flights around Cecil field; still no indications in my log book of any weapons work.

On March 23rd, we began night FCLPs at Whitehouse.  I logged 35 night FCLPs on four flights at the end of March.






The Nguyen Hue Offensive- March 30th,1972

At noon on 30 March, 1972 30,000 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops, supported by regiments of tanks and artillery, rolled southward across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separated North and South Vietnam. This three division force caught the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and their American advisors unprepared. The NVA force struck the positions of the ARVN 3rd Division and threw it into disarray. The South Vietnamese forces fell back, and a race began between both sides to the bridges at Dong Ha and Cam Lo in I Corps.

President Nixon's first response was to consider a three day attack by B-52 bombers on Hanoi and Haiphong. However Henry Kissinger convinced him to reconsider, in order not to jeopardize the formulation of the SALTY I Treaty with the Soviets that was due to be signed in May.


We were scheduled for another Med cruise. But, things were going to change for us in a big way.
 
With President Nixon in the White House, our national policy was to increase the pressure on the North Vietnamese by increasing our aircraft carrier presence on Yankee Station.

The result for us was that
we were directed to transfer 12 A7Es and replace them with 12 A7Cs and deploy to Yankee Station in June instead of the Mediterranean!

The basic difference between the A7E and the A7C was the engine.
The A7E had the Allison TF-41 engine (14,250 lbs thrust). The A7C had the Pratt & Whitney TF30-P-408 engine (14,560 lbs thrust)


April, 1972

I flew 22 flights in April (35.1 hours)
2 A7E flights (3.7 hours),  19 A7C flights (29.8 flight hours) , and 1 TA4 flight (1.6 hours)
I logged 16 America traps (10 day, 6 night) for a cumulative total of America traps of 134.


We had very little time to FCLP in the A7C before flying out to the America for type training. I had one FCLP flight to check out the difference in the TF30-P-408 throttle response while making glide path adjustments on the ball.

I flew out to America and made two day traps and then turned around for my night quals and made 2 night traps. I ended up flying 18 type training flights from America in April. Two of these flight involved landings at Cecil. So, I logged 16 traps (10 day, 6 night) in April for a total of  134 America traps.

We continued what would turn out to be one continuous two month type training period in May. My logbook doesn't indicate the types of flights. But, we certainly were very proficient in the CAG 8/America standard operating procedures day and night by the end of May.

May, 1972

I flew 16 A7CF flights in May (28.8 hours)
  I logged 14 America traps (11 day, 3 night) for a cumulative total of America traps of 148.



June, 1972

Another big surprise!  
On June 2nd, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations, visited the America and explained why the ship's orders had been changed from a cruise to the Mediterranean to a combat deployment to Vietnam. President Nixon had decided to increase the pressure on the North Vietnamese by extending air combat missions from the limitations of President Johnson's 's bombing halt.  This presidential initiative called Operation Linebacker I required four aircraft carriers on Yankee Station simultaneously.  As a result, USS Midway CVA 41, USS America CVA 66, and USS Saratoga CVA-60 would be ordered to join USS Kitty Hawk CVA 63 and USS Constellation CVA 64 in the Tonkin Gulf so that four carriers could be on station at one time.
(This was paraphrased from a Wikipedia discussion of Linebacker One)

This change in mission required that I had a lot to do as Maintenance Officer in the short time we had before deployment.  The Maintenance Control Officer, Phil Morris and the Maintenance Control Chief, Master Chief Jim Moorehead had done a great job in getting the required technical manuals and parts bulletins (IPBs) necessary to accomplish the maintenance of our A7Cs. We had had two months to adjust to the TF30-P-408 engine. There were still some jet engine mechanics around who had been with the squadron's 1970 deployment to WESTPAC flying the A7Bs with the same engine. The avionics systems were basically the same in both aircraft. But, we had two major challenges. First, to make sure that our electronic warfare (EW) personnel were up to snuff in the maintenance and use of the EW test equipment which would be critical for a Tonkin Gulf combat cruise.



Second, our biggest problem was that we didn't have nearly enough aviation ordnancemen assigned to the squadron. We had about 14. But, we would need almost twice that number for Linebacker One operations on Yankee Station. Our Commanding Officer Tom Scott "gresaed the skids" with the Latwing and the CO, of VA-174 so I could work directly with te Maintenance Officer at VA-174 to see if we could work something out. I knew that Navy ordnancemen would jump at the chance to join us if they had the opportunity. It wasn't so much for the combat pay. It was more about actually doing what they were trained to do. It turned out, I was right. We had ten more ordnancemen within the week. We deployed with about 24 ordnancemen.


June, 1972

I flew only 4 in June (7.0 hours)
  I logged 3 America traps (2 day, 1 night) for a cumulative total of America traps of 151.

I flew an A7C from Cecil t NAS Norfolk for the aircraft load aboard. 


America got underway on June 5th, 1972 for our WESTPAC Vietnam Deployment

I flew three flight from America; June 8th, 15th, and 18th as the ship was transiting the Atlantic Ocean.

The Transit Route


America's transit route would take us southeast toward Capetown, South Africa via the Cape of Good Hope then northeast
through the southern Indian Ocean through the Maldives and the Straits of Malacca then north north east to Subic bay Philippines for a short stop then out to the South China Sea to Yankee Station.


Crossing the Equator



Our transit route meant that we would cross the Equator twice during our transit; first in the Atlantic going southeast in the South Atlantic Ocean off the coat of North Africa and next in the Indian Ocean enroute to the Straits of Malacca.

The Atlantic crossing provided the best opportunity to celebrate the crossing of the Equator as us Shellbacks would indoctrinate the lowly Pollywogs to the World of King Neptune.



COD Landing Incident Cape Town, South Africa

As the America was rounding the Cape of Good Hope, the ship's COD flew in to Cape Town to pick up some mail and critical parts.
Upon landing, the COD drifted from port to starboard with it's right wing crossing the foul line impacting the tails of several A7s parked there.




I was in our ready room relaxing and happened to glance at the CCTV as the COD's wing impacted four or five A7 tails.
As Maintenance Officer of the squadron, I was shocked as I watched one rudder after another shatter.
Then I noticed that all of the rudders had red diamonds on them, all VA-86 aircraft. I felt bad for them but I must admit, I was glad they were not ours.
I think our metal smiths (AMS) helped the VA-86 guys. In most cases, the repairs were limited to replacing the rudders.


  America's transit took about 33 days from Norfolk on June 5th until she arrived
At NAS Cubi Point on about July 7th


There was a lot to do besides holding crossing of the Line festivities!



I used some of the time to continue with my ship training with an eye to someday getting my own ship.

The ship scheduled time for those of us so interested to observe along side replenishment events from the bridge wing.

I also spent more time in the boiler and engine rooms refreshing my ship engineering knowledge.

I also made a suggestion to the CO, XO, and Snuffy that we consider removing the inboard weapons stations (3 and 6) from our A7Cs.




Our A7C's had a weight restriction of 500 lbs (one MK 82 bomb) on weapons stations (3 and 6) due to center of gravity factors with the A7C TF30-P-408 engine.

I felt that we should remove stations 3 and 6 from our aircraft because the reduced drag would increase our top end airspeed which would be more important in  Linebacker One Operations over North Vietnam than losing two MK 82s from our bomb load.


The CO, XO, and Snuffy agreed. So our maintenance guys set to work to reconfigure the aircraft
and have them all checked out prior to arriving at Cubi Point in the Philippines.


Our next and most important task was to conduct ground training for our pilots
in squadron standard operating procedures in the North Vietnam tactical combat environment.

A Brief Overview of Linebacker One



The purpose of Linebacker One was to slow the transportation of supplies and materials for the North Vietnamese Nguyen Hue Offensive that had been launched on March 30th. This offensive consisted of three North Vietnamese operations that were launched that spring.

On March 30th , 300,000 North Vietnamese troops (NVN) supported by regiments of tanks and artillery rolled south across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

On April 5th, a force of 20,000 NVN troops crossed the border from their sanctuaries in Cambodia in a combined arms force to attack Binh Long Province north of Saigon.

The third attack came from Laos on April 12th, seizing a series of border outposts in the Central Highlands.

(This next section is paraphrased from a Wikipedia discussion of Linebacker One)

On April 4th, 1972, President Nixon authorized the bombing of all of North Vietnam North Vietnam which had been previously limited to reprisal raids just above the DMZ up to the 18th parallel.

Linebacker One was the first continuous bombing effort conducted against North Vietnam since the end of Rolling Thunder in November 1968.

The U.S. began a rapid build up of air power.

The USAF Tactical Air Command deployed 176 F4D Phantoms and an additional squadron of F-05 Thunderchiefs from Korea to Thailand.
The USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC) deployed 124 B-52s from the states to Guam bringing the total B-52 strength to 209.
The Navy augmented the USS Kitty Hawk and USS Constellation which were already in WESTPAC by ordering USS Midway from the west coast, and USS America and USS Saratoga from the east coast to deploy to WESTPAC. This added three more carrier air wings to the force and increased the number of ships from 84 to 138.

Linebacker One would have four objectives:

                         To isolate North Vietnam from its outside sources of supply by destroying railroad bridges and rolling stock in and around Hanoi and northeast to the Chinese border; to target primary storage areas and marshaling yards; to destroy storage and trans-shipment points;
and to
eliminate (or at least da
mage) the North Vietnamese air defense system.

Air Force and Navy commanders and pilots were relieved that President Nixon, unlike President Johnson, left the operational planning to local commanders and loosened targeting restrictions that had hampered Operation Rolling Thunder in 1966 through 1968.

However, there were still target restrictions.  Bombing of the North Vietnam's dike system was still off limits, bombing of third country ships in Haiphong Harbor was still off limits unless specifically approved, and bombing of non military targets downtown Hanoi and Haiphong was off limits.

But, targets that were now open to attack at the local commander level were;
 mining of Haiphong harbor and nearby harbors and military targets in Hanoi and Haiphong.



There were some changes to the North Vietnamese air defense system that would affect our tactics.

For the fighter pilots:  The were many more MIG 21s and MIG 19s around and fewer MIG 17s!
For the Attack Pilots: The North Vietnamese had added many more 37/57/85 mm AAA guns and trained gun crews including the Soviet ZSU 23-4 to its air defense system! The Soviets had provided training for the SAM batteries in new techniques which included multiple site engagements,
track-on-jam, optical tracking, and high-low engagements which improved their effectiveness.





The North Vietnamese still had small arms, manual barrage fire 37mm and 57 mm AAA, radar controlled 57/85/100mm AAA (firecan, flapwheel etc), and the SA-2 SAMs.  The SAMs were no longer deployed in established sites but were better dispersed and camouflaged.

A big change was the deployment of many ZSU quad mounted, radar controlled, mobile 23mm Soviet systems pictured here. This weapon was a game changer!

Iron Hand (anti SAM) aircraft could no longer orbit a SAM site at 12,000 feet waiting for the site to launch and then shoot a Shrike "down the throat". The ZSU 23 would pick you off at those altitudes. Its tracers were a rope of 23mm death. Iron Hand aircraft would have to launch their Shrikes into a "basket" from some distance from the target.

Strike aircraft would avoid the ZSU 23 by keeping the ingress altitudes above the ZSU 23 effective range. Strike aircraft would only be vulnerable to MIGs, SAMs, and radar controlled 85/100mm at 18,000 or so.




The Chain of Command for the Carrier Division Ten/USS America/Carrier Air Wing Ten Team






Commander Carrier Division Seven

Rear Admiral John S. Christiansen


Combat Pilot During WW2 and Korea



Navy Cross
Distinguished Flying Cross








Commanding Officer USS America CVA 66


Captain Burton H. Shepherd




Fighter Pilot During Korea

CAG 16 USS Oriskany 1967 Vietnam


Navy Cross
Two Silver Stars
Six Distinguished Flying Crosses
Eight Air Medals


CO VA-81 (A4 Skyhawks)








The Admiral and the Captain
were experienced combat veterans
who understood what we would be
facing in executing Linebacker One







Carrier Air Wing Eight

VF 74 Be-Devilers (F4J Phantoms)
VFMA 333 Shamrocks (F4J Phantoms)
VA-82 Marauders (A7C Corsairs)
VA-86 Sidewinders (A7C Corsairs)
VA-35 Black Panthers (A6A Intruders)
RVAH 6 Fleurs (RA5C Vigilantes)
VAQ 132 Scorpions (EA6B Prowlers)
VAW 124 Bullseye Hummers (E2C Hawkeyes)
HC 2 Det 66  (SH3G Rescue Helicopters)


VF 74 Be-Devilers




F4J Phantoms
VF-74 was primarily interested in only the air to air mission. But they did fly some Flak suppression missions.


VFMA 333 Shamrocks



F4J Phantoms
The Shamrocks were trained for and were enthusiastic about participating in ground attack missions such as flak suppression and air to ground bombing especially Close Air Support
As a result, the Shamrocks were more valuable to the air wing because they were interested in and were capable of being assigned bombing missions and strike support flak suppression.

VA-82 Marauders



A7C Corsairs

VA-86 Sidewinders



A7C Corsairs

VA-35 Black Panthers



A6A Intruders

RVAH 6 Fleurs





RA5C Vigilantes

VAQ 132 Scorpions



EA6B Prowlers

VAW 124 Bullseye Hummers




E2C Hawkeyes

HC 2 Det 66




SH3G Rescue Helicopters


COD- Miss America


I flew off America to NAS Cubi Point on July 6th (Part of CAG 8 Fly Off)


The BOQ and Officer's Club were on the hill just above the left third of the runway.

The first thing to do was to get up the hill and get a room at the BOQ and then get a "Cubi Special" at the Cubi Bar.


It was a short walk from the BOQ to the Cubi Point O'Club.

The Cubi Point Bar was famous and you could also get a good meal at the restaurant.

We were only going to be inport Cubi for a few days.  But, there was time enough for at least one trip
to Olongapo; to show the new guys "the ropes" of course!








We most likely devoted one day and an overnight for Jungle Escape and Survival Training.



JEST was essential training for the new guys who had never had it before and was a great review for the old hands also.


On July 9th, I flew back on to America from NAS Cubi Point (Part of CAG 8 Fly On).





Photo from USS America 1972 Cruise Book




The America relieved the USS Coral Sea on Yankee Station on July 12th, 1972

It would turn out to be a very short line period!
 

Photo from USS America 1972 Cruise Book


My great friend, Possum Terrell, had already been out on Yankee Station for over a month. Possum came to Yankee Station as the XO the VA 105 Gunslingers onboard USS Saratoga CVA-60. But the CO of the VA 93 Ravens' on USS Midway CVA 41 was shot down and Possum was picked to relieve him as CO. So, Possum was XO of VA 105 in the morning and CO of VA 93 on the afternoon of June 12th. Possum would remain as CO of the Ravens through the end of the war. He would fly Iron Hand missions at night for the B-52s during President Nixon's Linebacker II which would end the air war!


  Our flights for the first six days of the line period on Yankee Station were flown in the northern part of South Vietnam.
We would fly missions in support of the Second Battle of Quang Tri.




Most of these mission were in Quang Tri Province which is located in the north central region of South Vietnam between Hue City and the DMZ.

Except for the narrow coastal plains, the terrain is dominated by hills and the Annamite Mountains in the west.





After the Battle of Khe Sanh in July 1968 , the camp was evacuated by the Marines. The North Vietnamese (NVA) continued their efforts to take over the entire Quang Tri Province. In 1972, the NVA were successful in capturing the town of Quang Tri (First Battle of Quang Tri).

Quang Tri city and much of the lost territory in Quang Tri Province was retaken during the South Vietnamese (ARVN) from June through September 1972 (The Second Battle of Quang Tri).


As our squadron CO, CDR Scott lead the first combat mission of the deployment.


"The Stories of One Shot Scott"

A great collection of sea stories taken from the naval career of Tom Scott Captain USN Ret.

Copyright 2013 by Thomas P. Scott


C
reate Space 2013
Amazon.com

In his book, "The Stories of One Shot Scott",  CDR Scott describes our squadron's first combat sortie and the level of excitement in the ready room. Traditionally, the sorties assigned the few days of a Vietnam deployment were to relatively low threat area.  In keeping with that tradition, CDR Scott's mission was tasked to a "milk run" near the DMZ. However, his "piece of cake" mission was changed by the Forward Air Controller (FAC) to attack a AAA site on Tiger Island, a much more exciting alternative. CDR Scott tells his story on pages 125 through 128 of his book; a great read!



Flights recorded in my Logbook

July 14th- 1.8 hours, 8 MK82s, CAS/DAS with FAC  Nail 212              CAS= Close Air Support (troops in contact),  DAS= Direct Air Support (suspected base camps)
July 14th- 1.8 hours, 10 Mk 82s, CAS/DAS with FAC  Covey 82

Note: Covey FACs flew the OV-10 Bronco. It was a "fast mover" so could fly up to about 250 kts making it more difficult to hit with small arms fire!

July 15th- 2.1 hours, 6 MK 83, CAS/DAS, FAC Covey 86 (Ashaw Valley)  I earned my 18th Strike Flight Air Medal on this flight
July 16th- 2.0 hours, 10 MK 82, CAS/DAS, FAC Tom 23

July 17th- 1.5 hours (1.5 hours night time), 10 MK 82s Pave Phantom flight*

Pave Phantom Missions


USAF Pave Phantom F4D

There were actually two types of missions that involved the use of USAF F4D aircraft; Pave Phantom and Combat Sky Spot.

Pave Phantom:  On this type of mission, a specially configured F4D was fitted with AN/ARN-92 LORAN -D equipment. This type of aircraft, like the one pictured above, could be identified by a rather prominent white "towel-rail" antenna on the upper rear fuselage. The primary mission of Pave Phantom F4D aircraft was the seeding of the Ho Chi Minh Trail with sensors which required the precise nighttime navigational capability provided by LORAN. I expect that on occasion, these Pave Phantom configured aircraft were used in the "Combat Sky Spot" mission.

Combat Sky Spot:
On this type of mission, remotely located ground radars were used to guide specially trained USAF aircrews to drop bombs at level high altitude based on verbal cueing and coordination between the aircrew and the radar site. Accuracy was in hundreds of feet. This mission was normally flown at night and targeted the Ho Chi Minh Trail. On these missions, our A7 aircraft would fly on either wing of the F4 and drop our bombs when the F4 crew dropped (both aircraft would be carrying the same type of bombs; MK 82 500# bombs).

I expect that the flights documented as Pave Phantom flights in the "Remarks" section of my log book were actually "Combat Sky Spot" missions as we delivered MK 82 bombs not "sensors".

Whatever the mission, on these flights a flight of two A7s would join up on the USAF F4D Phantom at some pre-briefed location such as a TACAN radial and distance).  Each A7 would fly a loose parade position on each wing of the F4. The Phantom would be radar or LORAN controlled and bomb release was coordinated by USAF ground controllers. The target was usually a suspected NVA base camp, tunnel complex, or simple harassment along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Navy planes would carry the same type bombs as the Air Force  F4D.  We would release our bombs manually when we saw the bombs release from the F4D. The only issue for us was that we suspected that the Air Force was using a new type of electric fuse which had a bad habit of activating prematurely. I always briefed my wingman to break up and away from the F4 as soon as our bombs were released. We used manual fuses!

 On one of these flights, I was on the left wing of the F4; my wingman was on the right. We broke up and away from the F4; electrically fused F4D  bombs detonated prematurely destroying the aircraft probably killing the pilot and "back seater". No PRC-90 transmissions were ever heard or traces of the pilots discovered.

Neither of our aircraft received damage.

Back to flights recorded in my Logbook

July
17th- 2.1 hours, 10 Mk 82s, CAS/DAS, FAC Covey 75

July 18th- 2.0 hours, 10 MK 82s, CAS, FAC Covey 4, Quang Tri  my 210th combat mission

July 18th- 2.3 flight hours, , combat tanker (1 point)

July 19th- 1.7 hours, 10 MK 82s, DAS, TACAN drop
July 19th-  2.2 hours, 10 MK 82s, DAS, TACAN drop

Note: TACAN drops involved dropping all our bombs in one run at a radial and distance from a TACAN. We presumed the target was NVA on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.


On June 20th, we began flying missions over North Vietnam
At first, we did a couple of lower threat road reconnaissance flights (Road Recces).





July 20th- 2.1 hours, 10 MK 82s, Road Recce Route Package 2, Keep the airspeed about 450 kts and altitude above 3,000 to 4000'.  Familiarize yourself with the
                                                navigation and topography, look for trucks or carts moving on the roads or sampans on the waterways.  Look for any small bridges
                                                that have not been destroyed. Be careful to stay away from the SAM sites and AAA sites at Vinh.

July 20th- 2.1 hours, 10 MK 82s, Road Recce Route Package 3,
Keep the airspeed about 450 kts and altitude above 3,000 to 4000'.  Familiarize yourself with the                                                     navigation and topography, look for trucks or carts moving on the roads or sampans on the waterways.  Look for any small bridges                                                 that have not been destroyed. Be careful to stay away from the SAM and AAA sites at Thanh Hoa and Ninh Binh.


OK, now that we have had a couple of "warm up combat flights", it's time to get on with it!





July 21st-1.4 hours, 4 Mk 20 Rockeyes (expended), Flak Suppression Group Division Lead, Thanh Hoa Bridge Strike

                            The Mk 20 Rockeye consisted of a clam-shell dispenser containing 247 amour piercing shaped-charge bomlets.
                            Although it was designed to kill tanks and armored vehicles, it proved to be very effective against area targets
                            such as heavy AAA guns and their associated radar control vans.





This was a great first strike for me because I had quite a bit of experience getting shot at from AAA sites around Thanh Hoa during my 1967 Vietnam deployment with VA-15 on the USS Intrepid during the summer of 1967.  Of course they had increased the number of guns there during the Johnson bombing halt. There were many new manual 37 and 57 mm barrage fire AAA sites. And, I expected that they would have brought in some of the quad mounted 23mm rapid fire mobile gun systems. But, I was confident that they would still have the radar controlled 57 and 85 mm guns located on the approaches of the bridge especially where I have annotated the photo below with AAA. So, I had the known locations of those guns entered in my system so that I could toss my Rockeyes into that location if the guns had not started firing when I reached my roll in position. I had my other section concentrate their Rockeyes on the other side of the river.


I was not disappointed. My flak suppressor section got several good secondaries as our Rockeye bomblets found some ammunition. I expect that there were some casualties among the gun crews as well. And, I hoped that the projectiles might have damaged some of the guns.



July 22nd- 1.4 hours, 2 AGM 45 Shrikes (not expended), 2 MK 20 Rockeye (expended), Nam Dinh Strike Iron Hand

                                                                                   



July 23rd-1.5 hours, 2 AGM 45 Shrikes (expended), 2 MK 20 Rockeye (not expended), Haiphong Strike Iron Hand

July 24th- 1.4 hours, 10 MK 82s, Hon Gay Barracks Division Lead



July, 1972

 
I flew 21 flights in July (38.2 hours) 5 non combat flights and 16 combat missions (219 total combat missions)
  I logged 20 America traps (19 day, 1 night) for a cumulative total of America traps of 171.



We really hadn't earned admission to the Tonkin Yacht Club yet. But,

We had flown some missions in Quang Tri in support of the ground forces there.
We had flown some Pave Phantom missions.
We had flown some low threat road recces in Route Packages 2 and 3.
We had flown bomber, iron hand, and flack suppression missions
in Route Packages 4 and 6B.


We had a good warm up and had flown a few high threat missions without
loosing any aircraft or pilots. We were ready for more challenging targets in Route Pack 6B!


After only ten days on the line, the America experienced a ruptured main fuel pump which prompted an early return to
Naval Station Subic Bay for repairs. 
The repair work required two weeks to complete.


Relationship of Naval Staion Subic Bay (bottom) and NAS Cubi Point (top)



The crew liked the location of the America alongside in Subic Bay as it was a short walk to the Enlisted and Chief's Clubs and the gate to Olongopo. The pilots however preferred the Cubi BOQ and the Cubi O'Club which were a taxi ride from the ship and the main gate to Olongopo.


Two weeks in Subic Bay/Cubi Point would challenge the endurance of the most dedicated liberty hound!
No one could h
andle two weeks of Olongapo liberty.


If you want to see a good depiction of Olongapo liberty, watch
Steven Coontz's "Flight of the Intruder" movie.
It actually combines the antics of the Cubi Point O'Club carrier arrestment activity
with the atmosphere of Paulines' liberty in Olongapo including crocodile feeding.

Actually, I discovered the the Marmont Hotel just on the other side of the bridge which had an excellent restaurant. I visited it often!

Those sailors on the left side of the image were probably not returning from the Marmont;. It was more likely they were returning from bars like Paulines!

Besides the Marmont in Olongapo, there were lots of good places to eat on base. Both the Cubi Point and Subic Bay Officer's Clubs had excellent restaurants. Subic also had a place called the 'Chuck Wagon' which had good barbeque. If you were lucky enough to meet a Philipino family and were invited to join them for a home cooked meal, you were in for a treat. To this day, I am disappointed if I go to a Navy reception and they don't serve lumpia!

For some reason, I didn't play tennis in WESTPAC. I did play some golf though at the Subic Bay Golf Club.




This golf course was magnificent.
It had lots of relief change from tee to green and jungle rough.Players were required to have personal Philippino caddies. Players were prohibited to go into the jungle to retrieve a lost ball due to the danger from poisonous bamboo snakes. The caddies did that. They always found your ball or a reasonable facsimile of your ball.

Or, you could go out to the Grande Island Recreation area in Subic Bay and go swimming or just relax on the beach.
 




 Or, you could go to Manila
 



In 1972, a great place to stay and hang out was the Army Navy Club Hotel pictured here.

It has since been renovated and is now the Rizal Park Hotel

When I was in Manila, I enjoyed watching the Jai Alai while drinking San Miguel beer.




Or, you could travel north to the mountains of Baguio and play golf or go horseback riding.
 




With the feed pump repairs complete, the America finally got underway on about August 8th to return to the line.


August, 1972

 
I flew 19 flights in August (35.1 hours); 2 non combat flights and 17 combat missions (234 total combat missions)
  I logged 18  America traps (11day, 7 night) for a cumulative total of America traps of 189

August 9th-  0.4 hours,  a short non combat flight from America back to Cubi Point for some reason August 9th-  0.4 hours,  a short non combat flight from Cubi Point back to America.

 Our Second Line Period (August 8th through August 30th)

Back to Quang Tri for a couple of days!
 
August 11th- 1.9 hours, 10 MK 82s, CAS/DAS, FAC Tum 23 August 12th- 2.6, 4 Kk 82s, 2 MK 20 Rockeyes,  Merchant Ship Surveillance with Lauredo 17

MERSHIP Missions

MERSHIP Missions stand for Merchant ship reconnaissance missions. These flights of two aircraft under the control of a surface radar from a ship or aircraft (in this case Laurado 17) would direct the MERSHIP mission A7s to investigate unknown surface ship contacts, identify them if possible and engage them them if they met the 'Rules of Engagement" guidelines. The MK 20 Rockeye was the perfect weapon for the initial attack that was moving as it was an area weapon and it's bomlets were capable of penetrating eight inches of steel. The MK 82s were an excellent weapon for a ship that had lost its propulsion and was "dead in the water".

Note: P3s were the normal airborne asset used for the MERSHIP mission.

Normally MERSHIP Missions were a relatively routine mission. But, Gary Tabbert has a"sea story" about a MERSHIP mission that he flew on that was not "routine". I'll insert his story as soon as he gives me the details.



Back up North!

August 13th- 1.7hours, Walleye, Vinh, bad weather, My 220 mission  

August 14th, 2.2 hours, 5 MK 83s, Thanh Hoa Sam Site

I was awarded my 7th NCM for this mission
 

I was awarded my 7th NCM for this mission.






August 15th- 2.1 hours,  4 MK82s, 4 MK 20 Rockeyes,  Night Road Recce August 16th- 2.0 hours, 4 Mk 82s, 4 Mk 20 Rockeyes, Night Road Recce August 17th- 1.9 hours, 4 MK 82s, 4 MK 20 Rockeyes, Night Road Recce

Yankee Station Aircraft Carrier Operating Hours

There were two type of operating hours for Yankee Station carriers:

Two carriers flew from 7 in the morning to 7 at night so that two carrier airwings were available to execute daytime major strike packages.

One carrier flew from7 at night to 7 in the morning to cover the night A6 low level strikes, A7 night recce, and F4 Phantom night BARCAP (Barrier Combat Air Patrol) requirements.

If there was a forth carrier available, it normally flew the 7 am to 7 pm schedule except for special circumstances such as the Linebacker 2 night B-52 strikes to Hanoi in December when two carriers flew the night schedule.


Back to flights recorded in my Logbook


August 17th- 2.4 hours, 6 MK 82s, Mership Recce                    20th Strike Flight Air Medal

August 18th- 1.9 hours, 5 MK 46 Destructor Mines, 5 MK 82s, Vinh,  2 SAMs fired

August 19th- 1.3 hours, 10 MK 82s, Hong Gay Barracks Division Lead (My 2nd flight to to the Hon Gay barracks)


I don't have much more information about this mission except this cart showing the barracks complexes which existed when this map was made!


Night Missions over North Vietnam

Our "normal" A7 night recce missions were flown at medium to high altitudes away from any low altitude AAA including the ZSU 23-4.  When we saw a target, we would usually use the computed toss delivery which would keep us out of harms way. 

When I think about flying night recce flights, I think about Seven Coontz' "Flight of the Intruder".  You would always know the route where those 500 ft low level single night A6 were flying.  All you had to do was look down at the trail of low level AAA shooting at the A6 all the way to and from the target.  Luckily, most of the manually fired AAA was usually a bit behind the A6 which was flying about 450 kts.

The A7 Night Terrain Following Radar (TFR) Night Capability


A7 TFR Patch
I remember seeing some of the VA-174 instructor pilots wearing A7 TFR patches on their flight suits or flight jackets. But, I don't recall flying any dedicated terrain following radar flights in the RAG curriculum. We did some familiarization flights with the APQ-126 radar and some night flying but no real emphasis on using the radar in conjunction with the inertial navigation system and radar altimeter on any night low level training flights.

During our VA-82 squadron workup before deployment, there wasn't any significant effort directed toward developing the skills required to gain the level of expertise required in night radar system navigation, radar target recognition, and systems weapons delivery required to safely fly the mission in combat.

The demands on the pilot of a single seat airplane were simply too high to fly this type of mission, especially in a combat environment. We had other light attack skills that took priority.


Night low level terrain following navigation and radar systems weapons delivery was the domain of the two seat A-6 Intruder. In the Intruder,  the pilot and bomber navigator (BN)  could share the load;  the BN was primarily responsible for navigating, radar target recognition, weapons delivery while giving the pilot warning of radar controlled SAMs and AAA while pilot  kept his eyes on the flight instruments, visual AAA and SAM detection, and evasive maneuvering required in a combat environment.

August 20th- 2.1 hours, 4 MK 82s, 2 Mk 20 Rockeyes, Night Recce, 3 SAMs fired (wingman-Jim Kuzmick)


Jim Kuzmick

  Apparently some "hot shot staff type on the flag staff told the Admiral that the A7E had a TFR capability which resulted in my being scheduled for a night  mission in Route Package 6B with Jim Kuzmick as my wingman. I don't recall whether we were expected to fly an A6 Intruder type low level profile to a pre-briefed radar significant target or whether it was a road recce mission. I assume it was the later because I am am confident that CDR Scott as Commanding Officer and my roommate Snuffy Smith as Operations Officer would have never signed off on our being scheduled for an A6 type mission. The A7 had a marginal capability at best compared to the A6 and we did not have the training to safely execute the night low level TFR mission.


I don't remember which type of mission we briefed in the preflight brief. But, I do remember briefing a navigation route that had some radar significant turn points while keeping our route relatively free from flying over any concentrations of SAM and AAA sites, as least as well as was possible in Route Pack 6B. I'm sure we used medium altitude tactics. We would not have used low altitude tactics as we were not trained for them.

I do remember vividly that not long after going feet wet at the coast, I saw the track of a single A6 low level level flight enroute to a Hanoi area target.  It was not difficult watching his progress; just watch the AAA. Not long after, we saw a SAM lift off probably twenty miles away or so. But, at night, it looked as if it was just off our nose. Our EW gear told us that we were not the target. But, it sure got our attention! As we progressed along our route, we were engaged by two SAMs. We were the target this time. After maneuvering to avoid the SAMs, I turned the flight back around toward the coast and Jim and I dropped our bombs on a bridge that was one of our secondary targets.

More About Jim Kuzmick


Picture from USS America 1972 Cruise Book

This is Jim Kuzmick entertaining the sailors onboard USS America in Hangar Bay One during our 1972 Vietnam deployment with James Taylor and Simon & Garfunkle tunes.

I also remember Jim playing in one of the Olongapo bars (Jim says that he does not remember doing this!). However, I think I remember enjoying a beer or two while listening to Jim entertain there. The Philippine entertainers enthusiastically surrendered the stage to "Kuz" because they enjoyed listening to Jim's folk music.

Jim learned a lot of folk music while in college at Princeton from some of his classmates. He had a rock band at Princeton and he hitch-hiked across the country in 1966 playing folk & blues in various "joints".

He also had a rock band during flight training with several Naval Academy grads.

But, he says that his favorite memories were playing for the large crowds of sailors on the America during stand down days.

Jim and I share the same James Taylor favorites; "Fire and Rain" and "Sweet Baby James".


Back to my Logbook Entries

August 22nd- 2.4 hours, 4 MK 82s, 2 MK 20 Rockeyes, night Mership Recce
August 23rd- 2.0 hours, 9 Mk 82s, 2 MK 20 Rockeyes, night 6B recce                230th combat mission

August 24th- 1.8 hours, 10 MK 82s, Division strike lead on the Xom Tuai Highway bridge.

I have no idea if this a picture from this strike.
It's just a great picture of an A7 pulling off after direct hits on a bridge!




August 25th- 2.3 hours, 9 MK 82s, 2 MK 20 Rockeyes, night 6B recce


Night Post Mission Refueling

Usually flights which lasted more than 1.8 or 1.9 hours would require airborne refueling on the way back to the ship from the mission A6 tanker the A7 recovery tanker.  Night 6B recce missions where you were shot at by AAA or SAMs, followed by night refueling on the way back to the ship, and ending with a night carrier landing were missions where you more than earned your flight pay.



Back to flights recorded in my Logbook

August 26th- 1.7 hours, 4 MK 82s, 2 Mk 20 Rockeyes, night MRSHIP recce with Owl 15

August 27th- 2.0 hours, 10 Mk 82s, Division lead- Vinh petroleum storage area (fuel tanks), secondary explosions





I was awarded my 8th NCM for this mission





I was the VA-82 element leader with six bomber aircraft as part of this major strike lead by LCDR Jim Hall, Operations Officer VA-86. The only VA-82 pilot recommended for the NCM besides myself (credited with a "massive secondary explosion") was my section leader (#3), Bob Corey who was also credited for the other "massive secondary explosion". Of course our wingmen's bombs may also been responsible for the secondaries but they were not recommended for any awards.


   My logbook records that I did not fly any combat missions from August 28th through September 5th (7 days).

Whenever we had a stand down break, we used the time for the time honored tradition of marking a centurion (100 traps) achievement
or milestone such as accident free period of operations with the traditional cake!



From left to right: WO1 John Young, me, Charlie Sapp. CDR Tom Scott CO, Master Chief Moorehead, LT Bruce Page,unknown maintenance CPO
Left to right: Ltjg Jim Brister, Lt Al Schwark, AMH1 Rothensberger, me, and PR1 Jackson
This cake ceremony actually took place in the ready room on June 15th during the transit from Norfolk to Cubi Point. It was traditional to present a parachute bag or similar bag to a departing pilot. This one actually conducted at the end of the 1971 Med cruise was presented to LT Al Schwarkl
These images were colorized by Ray Thomas using Photo Shop Elements 2020 software

Post Script: I was given a VA-82 garment bag similar to the one in the right picture to use when flying an aircraft on a "cross country" flight. Somehow, I lost track of it sometime after I left VA-82.  A few years ago, I was contacted by a "good Samaritan" who had purchased my parachute bag on E Bay. He know it was mine because my leather name tag was on it and he found me on Google.  He returned to me refusing payment!"Thank you for your service" was his reply.


I'll use this opportunity to relate problems we had with enlisted manning during this deployment.
The requirement for five carriers assigned to Yankee Station during Linebacker stressed the number of available personnel. To fill the void, the Navy lowered the requirement for enlistment.

Low quality replacement junior enlisted personnel !!!

Although essential personnel had their enlistments extended while on Yankee Station, junior enlisted personnel who departed the squadron needed to be replaced. But with the increased tempo of operations in WESTPAC, aircraft carriers, surface ships,and squadrons all needed replacement junior enlisted personnel. The problem was with anti-war fever rampant in the states, enlistment rates were down.
To solve the problem, entry qualification standards were lowered or ignored. One of those standards which was lowered was the requirement to be a high school graduate or at least have a GED. Another standard which was lowered or ignored was intelligence test scores.  Many new personnel showing up in WESTPAC had IQ ratings below 100; some as low as 80.
My policy as Maintenance Officer was to greet all new first enlistment personnel assigned to the Maintenance Department. I would normally do this in the ready room when there was a break of some kind.
I remember clearly talking with a group of 15 to 20 new arrivals in the ready room.  I discussed how the Maintenance Department worked onboard the carrier and how each of them would spend some time on temporary additional duty (TAD) with the ship as mess cooks or compartment cleaners. Some of would go TAD right away and then be assigned to the Line Division. Others would go to the Line Division first and then TAD.  I explained that the Line Division provided plane captains for the aircraft performing preflight inspections, engine start and systems checks on the flight deck. I explained that the flight deck during flight operations was dangerous place and that each new guy had to take his training seriously.
I remember looking out at this new group while I explained what was required of personnel on the flight deck. There was nothing but blank stares. The lights were on but nobody was home. Out of that entire group we were able to get only one guy who we felt could safely be assigned to the flight deck. The others either got repeated TAD assignments or worked in other non flight deck assignments.
That one guy was something special though. He came from a tough neighborhood in south Philly or east St Louis; someplace like that. His IQ was a bit under 100. But, he had goals; to serve his country and to gain skills. We assigned him to the Line Division. He became interested in becoming a jet mechanic. He studied his courses with help from his Line Division petty officers became a designated striker; ADJAN (E3). Before I left the squadron in December, he had been advanced to Petty Officer Third Class ADJ3 (E4). Everyone involved was very pleased with his accomplishment!

Race riots onboard America and other ships !!

Another serious problem with these new recruits was that some of them were gang members and had little or no interest in performing their tasks as airman, seaman, or fireman recruits. Instead, they roamed around the ship in groups making life difficult for the motivated sailors who were trying to do their jobs. There were scuffles, assaults, robberies, etc.

There were places on America on the second deck and below, especially around the mess decks that I avoided. I spent most of my time on the hangar deck or above. I was too busy with planning or flying missions to spend any time hanging around on the mess deck.

The problem was resolved quickly though. I don't know if the trouble makers were sent back to the states and discharged or whether the pace of operations was so intense in September and October that we pilots could only concentrates on planning and flying combat missions.  Perhaps the chiefs took care of the problem.

By the end of the war for the carriers in late December or early January, the emergency lowering of enlistment standards returned to reasonable levels and the trouble makers were gone from the Navy.


Inport Cubi Point from September 1st through September 5th

Cdr Sumner relieved Cdr Tom "Hook" Scott in Hangar Bay One on September 2nd, 1972



CDR Don Sumner  CDR J "Felter" Breast


CDR Breast brought much needed combat experience to the squadron and the air wing! Cdr Breast was a graduate of the Navy's Test Pilot School who had worked extensively with the testing of the AGM 62 Walleye TV guided air to ground missile. He was an experienced combat pilot with VA--163 which was part of CAG 16 onboard USS Oriskany in 1966 and 1967. He earned a Silver Star as part of a six plane strike with Walleye missiles against the Hanoi Thermal Power plant on August 21st, 1967. He was also awarded additional DFCs and Air Medals on that tour and while flying with VA-163 onboard the USS Hancock in 1968 and 1969.



Having just completed a busy month in August with 19 flights (35.1 hours) and 17 combat missions,
we were headed for an even busier September.

Looking back on it, this was evidence that President Nxon had decided to increase the pressure on the North Vietnamese even further.
We were going to be assigned more major target strikes and began mining the harbors of Haiphong and Hon Gai which was evidence that President Nixon was going to step the pressure on the North Vietnamese to end the war. 



September Logbook Entries

I flew 34 flights in September ( 63.7 hours); 3 non combat flights and 31 combat missions:  for 265 total combat missions.
I logged 33 carrier landings  ( 21 day, 12  night) for 2 total of 222 America traps .
I received no individual awards in September.

September 1st- 1.7 hours, non combat flight during from the America to NCP (Navy Cubi Point) 
September 5th- 2.7 hours, non combat flight from NCP back to the America

Our 3rd Line Period (September 5th through October 9th)

Operation Pocket Money


(The following section is paraphrased from Wikipedia)

At noon on March 30th, 1972, 30,000 troops supported by regiments of tanks and artillery, rolled across the DMZ which is known as the Nguyen Offensive. This three division force caught the South Vietnamese army and their American allies unprepared.  On April 27th, South Vietnamese defenses in Quang Tri Province began to collapse. President Nixon's first response was to consider a three day attack by B-52s on Hanoi and Haiphong. But Henry Kissinger convinced him to reconsider because he did not want to jeopardize the formalization of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 1) with the Soviets which was due to be signed in May.  authorized the mining of Haiphong harbor and other harbors northeast of Haiphong in May.

Note: Shortly after his inauguration, Nixon had ordered the preparation of a contingency plan called Operation Duck Hook which included the invasion of North Vietnam itself and included a proposal to mine it's major harbors. This plan had been shelved at the time as it was thought to be too extreme but it was not forgotten.

But in response to the Nguyen Offensive, President Nixon ordered the Joint Chiefs to prepare to execute the aerial mining portion of the Duck Hook plan within three days under the operational title Pocket Money. At precisely 0900 local time on May 9th, six A-7 Corsairs and three A-6 Intruders from the USS Coral Sea mined Haiphong harbor with thirty six 1,000# Mark-52 and Mark-55 naval mines. They were protected from attacks by North Vietnamese MIGs by the guided missile cruisers Chicago and Long Beach along with several destroyers and by supporting flights of F4 Phantoms from Yankee Station. The reason for the precise timing of the strike was because President Nixon simultaneously delivered a televised speech explaining the escalation to the American public. The mines were activated five days after their delivery to give any vessels then in port Haiphong time to escape without damage.

Following that, US carrier based aircraft from Yankee Station laid more than 11,000 more mines into North Vietnam's secondary harbors, effectively blocking all maritime commerce with North Vietnam. Shortly after that, Lloyds of London notified shipping companies worldwide that they would not cover the loss of any ship which was lost due to a mine in North Vietnam waters. No ships entered or left Haiphong harbor after that until the US cleared the mines as a part of the peace treaty in January 1973.

CAG 8 began conducted mining operations in near Haiphong harbor, at Cam Pha, Hon Gay and other harbors to make it more difficult to unload military supplies at those ports as part of Operation Pocket Money.

September 6th- 1.9 hours, Mk 36 Destructor Mines



Our objective was to lay mines in the areas protected by the karst islands which the boats are currently doing in the image.

We would fly at very low altitude between the islands. Instead of our normal combat division formation, we flew with the aircraft in a trail position so that we could observe the mine line established by the aircraft in front of us.

This would normally be an unwise approach, as the gunners would be more effective with each aircraft that passes their position.

However, it did not work out for them in this instance. Their 37/57 and ZSU 23 gun positions were located on the top of the islands as they were positioned to effective against high flying aircraft. As a result, they could not depress the gun angle on any of their AAA guns to shoot down at us at our low altitude. If they tried to, they basically shot across the water at each other above our heads. So, the only weapon they had to shoot at us were small arms. We were delivering the mines while flying about 420 knots airspeed, so we were a difficult target to hit. We couldn't tell if we were being shot at by small arms as we were intent on flying our mine line and drop point. To my knowledge, no one was hit by AAA or small arms on missions like this to the karst islands.


The Mk 36 Destructor Mine was a MK 82 500 lb bomb with Snakeye fins and a special fuse that set up a magnetic field around the bomb as it lay on the ground.

When the magnetic field was disturbed by a worker trying to repair a bridge or something similar, the metal tools he or she was carrying would cause the bomb to explode when the worker began walking away from the bomb.

The fuse sensed the CPA (closed possible approach) to detonate!



September 7th- 2.4 hours, 6 MK 82, MERSHIP

September 8th- 2.0 hours, 10 MK 82s, CAS/DAS FAC Covey 117, The Battle of Quang Tri

September 9th- 1.4 hours, 2 MK 20 Rockeyes (this is a strange bomb load) I was a division leader, Rockeyes would be used along with AGM 45 Shrikes for the Iron                                                                                     and mission or 4 MK 20 Rockeyes for the flack suppression mission. No target was indicated in my log book.



September 10th- 1.7 hours, no bomb load indicated, I suspect it was 2 AGM 45s and 2 MK 20 Rockeyes,
                                         Iron Hand mission in support of an air strike at a target near Hanoi. It was my 240th combat mission.






Ltjg Steve Musselman

VA-82 Maurauders

KIA  September 10th, 1972



This picture was published in black and white in an Hanoi newspaper.
It has been colorized by Ray Thomas using Photo Shop Elements 2020 software.

Ltjg Steve Musselman was a wingman in a section of VA-82 aircraft assigned as a part of that Iron Hand mission.  Steve's job was to maintain section integrity with his section leader Frank Gerwe and fire an AGM -45 Shrike missile or drop MK 20 Rockeyes as necessary to help prevent SAMs firing on the strike group.  Somewhere in the process, his aircraft was hit by an SA 2 Guideline missile.  He ejected from his aircraft about 20 miles south of Hanoi in the area near Phu Ly. 

VA-82 aircraft in the area observed Steve alive on the ground. Snuffy Smith as the on scene commander (with his wingman)
orbited the area at about 4,000 feet as the low RESCAP.  I orbited above at about 12,000'  to provide communications relay if there was going to be an attempt to rescue Steve. Unfortunately, Steve was observed to be captured before any reasonable attempt could be made to rescue him.

This is a picture of his aircraft, 310, which crashed in the vicinity of Phu Ly.  A version of this picture showing just the tail area appeared in the Hanoi newspaper the next day reporting that the remains of the pilot had been found in the cockpit. We suspected that Steve was killed by local Vietnamese during his capture.
His remains were returned by the North Vietnamese in 1981.




September 10th- 2.1 hours, 6 MK 82s, Night recce in Route Package 2,
 
(The dreaded night recce, followed by night refueling on the way back to the carrier, followed by a night arrested landing (another remedial brandy mission)



As night recce flights go, being assigned Route Package 2 was far less challenging than a Route Pack 4 or Route Package 6B night recce.

As long as you didn't stray too far north in to Route Package Three and the Thanh Hoa SAM envelope, your only threat was from Vinh. 

However, the missile commander at Vinh had a reputation of being able to fire his SAMs with little to no Fansong involvement until his missile was in the air. That meant very little warning.

As you flew about from Ha Tinh to Vinhj Son, it was best to stay west if Vinh along the main highway ready to attack any target that presented itself but with a wary eye to the east where the Vinh threat was.

If no target presented itself, I expended my Mk 82s using the A7 system loft technique using GPS coordinates I had loaded into the computer of a known AAA/SAM position.



Iron Hand Mission to Haiphong
September 11th- 1.6 hours, 2 AGM 45 Shrikes and 2 MK 20 Rockeyes



This mission was to provide Iron Hand support for the ingress and egress of an Alpha Strike to a target northeast of Hanoi.

 
On this mission, I expended one Shrike at a SAM site near Haiphong just as the missile lifted off from the site. I expect that the missile commander couldn't take the chance that the Shrike would impact the Fansong control van destroying the radar and killing missile personnel. So, he turned off the Fansong radar causing the SAM to self destruct.



It was a wonderful site watching the SAM detonate over  the launch area!


Intelligence photo taken on September 26th, 1972 of a SAM site near Haiphong.
This is a"classic" SAM site. The North Vietnamese later began constructing sites that were not so obvious!


This is a photo of a SAM site near Thanh Hoa. Notice that they have not used the "classic" configuration shown in the previous photograph.The site still has excellent road access for transporting the launchers and missiles to and from the site.
The photo was taken by a RVAH-6 Vigilante aircraft from 8,000ft altitude.


This is a photo of a the same SAM site near Thanh Hoa. This time the image was taken by a "Buffalo Hunter" reconnaissance drone, possibly from low altitude.



The Buffalo Hunter reconnaissance drone was a Ryan Model 147 Lightning Bug drone developed from a target drone. It began service during Rolling Thunder 1965 and was  operated by the Air Force.


Note: I saw one of these drones during my second Vietnam deployment south of Haiphong during an Iron Hand mission.
Actually, I had a near mid air with the drone. I reported the sighting to the CVIC (Carrier Intelligence Center) during my post flight debriefing. They doubted the veracity of my report!! They apparently were unaware of the then Secret Buffalo Hunter drone project called Fire Fly. These drones could be configured for a variety of missions including high and low altitude photographic and electronic reconnaissance, signals intelligence, and psychological warfare (from Wikipedia).


VMFA 333 MIG Kill/Ejection


                   


Major Lee "Bear" Lassiter

Captain John "Lil" Cummings

Major Lassiter, who was the Executive Offficer of VFMA 333 and his experienced Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) were the lead aircraft in a four plane BARCAP mission tasked to provide MIG cover for the Alpha Strike. The division split into two sections. Major Lassiter (Shamrock 201)and his wingman (Dash 2) encountered numerous MIGs in the vicinity of Hanoi. Major Lassiter was credited with one confirmed kill and one possible (damaged) and received a Silver Star for valor.

Major Lassiter's aircraft (Shamrock 201) and Dash 2 crossed the coastline very close to my position. Both aircraft were very low on fuel and were looking for a tanker. I was coasting out off the starboard wing of Shamrock 201 when it was hit from astern by a SAM.  I received no SAM radar indications on my APR or ALQ EW equipment; just a launch alert on my APR 27 just seconds before impact.  The tail section of Shamrock 201 separated from the aircraft and the plane tumbled forward out of control. Both Maj Lassiter and his RIO, Captain John Cummings were jammed into the canopy during the negative G tumble. Neither could reach the primary ejection handle on their seat headrests. Lil John managed to wedge a flight boot toe into the secondary ejection handle on his seat ejecting both crewmen. They were rescued unharmed other than exceptional red eyes from ruptured capillaries. Unfortunately, Dash 2 was unable to find a tanker in time and ran out of fuel over the warm water of the Gulf of Tonkin. Both crewmen of Dash 2 were rescued unharmed.

Note: Lil John Cummings made a tape of the entire mission including the shot down, SAM impact and subsequent ejection!



September 12th- 1.5 hours, 10 Mk 82s, Major strike leader for a target in the Ninh Binh area of Route Package 4.
                          I have no more information about this mission.


The Strike Leader is responsible for coordinating the planning for all aspects of the mission:

The F4 BARCAP is pretty straight forward for this type of mission. Usually 4 F4s would be dedicated to the mission but they would be stationed and coordinated by the Air Defense Cruiser PIRAZ.

The bombers would most likely be one division from each VA squadron; 8 A7s and 4 A6s.
There might be a section or two of flack suppressors from VA-86 and a section or two of Iron Hand from our squadron.

About 20 aircraft would be in the target area.
Each divisions' target aim point and timing would be the responsibility of the strike leader.


The E2 C and A6 EW aircraft would be briefed on the strike plan and incorporate it into their plans.
An RA-5C might be tasked to fly a post strike recce flight to provide timely BDA (bomb damage assessment) of the strike's success.


On one of these missions, possibly this one, I took my time exiting the area between the target and the coastline. I wanted to make sure that if one of our aircraft was hit that I would be in position to be the on-scene commander for RESCAP coordination. On this mission while I was biding my time, the RA5C made a pass at high speed over the target. When he did, I heard the unmistakable sound of a Fansong radar followed by the  shrill sound of the APR 27 missile launch warning.
Sure enough, their was a SAM lifting off from the Ninh Binh area but was HEADING RIGHT TOWARD MY SECTION !!

I
wasn't too worried though because I had a lot of altitude to turn in to the missile and I could  use my chaff and ECM equipment. I watched as the SAM passed about 1,000 feet below my section but was HEADING TOWARD THE RA5C !!  Good for me, but not good for him! I was worried that my good fortune became the RA5C's misfortune.  But, not to worry, the RA5C was going nearly supersonic and caused the SAM to overshoot and detonate harmlessly.

I learned in the debrief that the pilot of that RA-5C was LCDR Joe Satrapa who was one of the F8 Crusader Sundowner pilots on my 1967 VA-15 deployment.

 

Back to my log book

September 13th- 2.0 flight hours, One walleye and 4 MK82s, I was the division lead for a strike on the the Bong Tau highway bridge. 22nd Strike Flight Air Medal

                                              A have no BDA or any other information about this strike.


The AGM 62 Walleye II (Fat Albert) loaded on station 2 of an A7E.

The Walleye II used television guidance and packed a punch with its 2000lb warhead.

We loaded 4 Mk 82s (2000 lbs) on the similar station on the opposite side of the aircraft to provide symmetry on the way to the target.

If the Walleye II was expended, most pilots found a use for at least 2 of the MK 82s so the landing back on the ship wasn't too asymmetrical.

Bong Tau highway bridge is in Route Package 2 but unfortunately, I have no recollection of the strike. Oh well !


Lt Michael Rice a RIO (Radar Intercept Officer) in VF-74 was lost at sea on September 13th
.
I don't know any details about the accident or how he drowned and the pilot was rescued. I don't know if Mike's body was recovered.


Back to my Logbook Entries

September 14th- 2.3 flight hours, Night combat tanker (recovery tanker) 1.5 hours of night time, night landing.
September 15th- 2.0 hours, 4 MK 82s, Route Package 2 day recce





On September 17th CDR Verne Donnelly, Commanding Officer of VA-35
and his bombadier navigator, LCDR Ken Buell, were shot down during a strike at Hai Duong.

They ejected about eight miles west of the target. CDR Donnelly was classified as Missing in Action (MIA) until December 1976 when he was reclassified as
Killed in Action (KIA). His remains were returned by the North Vietnamese in 1991. LCDR Buell was classified as MIA. His remains were never returned and he is still listed as MIA. Neither officers were acknowledged as captured by the North Vietnamese !

Hai Duong Railroad Yard and Tedrminal



South Vietnam Missions

We flew south of the DMZ on numerous occasions to provide close air support for South Vietnamese forces which were being attacked by North Vietnamese Army forces during their major offensive which began during the spring of 1972.


Most of these missions occurred south of the DMZ from Quang Tri to DaNang


Some of the more spectacular of these missions took place during the Battle of Mo Duc near the coast south of DaNang.

September 17th- Mo Duc




The sequence of events of these missions is based on email discussions
with Charlie Sapp, Marv Baldwin, Jim Yeager, and Jim Kuzmick
and a Letter of Commendation written to the USS America by Covey 100 and Covey 111, the pilots in the OV-10 FAC.

Jim Yeager was the first to relate to me the events of the early morning of September 17th, 1972.  We must have been on the midnight to noon schedule. "Sometime after midnight {I suspect about 0400} a flight of 4 A7s from VA-82 (two sections) was scheduled for night recce in Route Package Four. I think we were loaded with 10 MK 82s per aircraft. The XO, Cdr Breast was scheduled as the flight leader of one section. Bob Corey and I (Jim Yeager) were the other section. However, his (XO Breast) aircraft went down on deck. So, we became a three plane flight. All three pilots were LTs and qualified section leaders. Bob Corey took the lead and the three planes proceeded to execute the night road recce mission. However during the flight, our mission was changed to proceed to Mo Duc to provide close air support".

At this point, the narrative becomes somewhat "hazy". In my opinion, the most likely sequence of events is as follows:

The tree plane flight (Lets call them Streecar 301) needed fuel as they had already burned some while initially proceeding northwest  toward Route Pack 4 and needed fuel to fly the 200 miles to Mo Duc and have fuel available to fly a CAS mission once they arrived at Mo Duc.

While the Streetcar 301 three plane were getting fuel, another section, Streetcar 303, with Charlie Sapp as lead and Marv Baldwin as wingman, was getting ready to launch on the next cycle {lets say 0530, a pinkie launch}.  Streetcar was vectored to Mo Duc immediately after launch arriving at Mo Duc about sunrise.

There was one OV-10  FAC in the area with two pilots onboard, Covey 111 and Covey 100. Covey 111 sated that "they sure were glad to see the Navy and that they were the first TACAIR to respond to their Tactical Emergency" call.  Note: M
ost tactical Air Force aircraft had been temporarily redeployed due to a typhoon warning.  Covey 111 stated that a large force (about 3,000) North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars supported by artillery (mortars) were about to overwhelm a much smaller South Vietnamese (ARVN) force of about 120 troops located in the village of Mo Duc. The OV-10 was barely "holding the NVA force back with their 2.75 "fleshette" rockets and M-60 guns.

Charlie Sapp states that Covey 111 requested that the A7s "split their load" making two bombing runs each to settle the mortars down. Then, Charlie made five strafing runs (with the A7C's M61 high rate of fire 20mm gattling gun) on the buildings where the North Vietnamese troops were staging for an assault on the village. The Covey 111 OV-10 continued to press the attack themselves on the side of the small runway nearest the village {sometimes as close as 25 meters from the friendlies} while Streetcar 303 worked the other side of the runway. {Charlie isn't sure whether Marv Baldwin's gun wasn't working or that he just didn't make note of what Marv was doing during the strafing.  About the time Streetcar 303 flight was "Winchester" {out of ordnance- sometimes referred to"ammo minus}, another flight, probaby the three plane Streetcar 301 was checking in. The Streetcar 303 flight departed to DaNang to get fuel and then return to the ship.

The next flight to check in was probably Streetcar 301 with Bob Corey as lead, Jim Yeager as #2 and Crash Landon as #3. The first Streetcar flight had destroyed some motars and prevented most of the North Vietnamese from crossing the small runway toward the village.  Streetcar 301 flight concentrated their MK 82 bombs on the mortars.  They
were extremely effective destroying most of the remaining mortars and killing or wounding many ground troops causing the North Vietnamese to abandon their attack. The flight departed the area when they had expended their ordnance and had to land at DaNang as they did not have enough fuel to return to the ship.

Several VA-86 sections {probably three,one of which received special mention as Sidewinder 400 in the FAC's letter to the USS America.

One of the last sections to participate in the Mo Duc event was Streetcar 302. The lead of this section was most likely Frank Gerwe (I'll be checking on this with him at the next ANA Lunch).  Jim Kuzmick was the wingman. Jim reports that his section was tasked with a day Road Recce of Route Pack 1 {probably Route Pack 2), when they were redirected to Mo Duc. "When we arrived, other flights had already departed". The FAC asked us to make as many runs as possible expending one bomb or two at a time. After Jim made several runs the FAC, Covey 111 was hit by 12.7 mm and probably some 7.62 mm (AK-47s) also. Their OV-10 was severely damaged and the crew was forced to eject. Jim reports that he made several strafing passes during the successful rescue by a helo from DaNang.

Mo Duc on September 17th, 1972 was an exciting day. the South Vietnamese force was not overrun and the larger North Vietnamese was unsuccessful suffering significant losses {A
pproximately 20 mortars were destroyed and 265 NVA bodies were recovered along the perimeter fence at the ARVN compound}.

Several Marauder pilots received personal awards for valor during these missions:




Individual Air Medal
with Bronze Star
Navy Commendation Medal Gallantry Cross
with Palm

Note: There were normally two awards awarded to pilots by the South Vietnamese government. The Gallantry Cross with Palm was for a specific mission.
The Cross of Gallantry is given after 100, 200, 300 mission etc. similar to the Strike Flight Air Medal.

The silver star indicates 200 missions. A gold star would indicate 100 missions

Charlie Sapp- individual Air Medal with combat V, Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm
Marv Baldwin- unknown (possibly a Navy Commendation Medal with Combat V)
Bob Corey- DFC (not approved)
Jim Yeager- individual Air Medal with combat V, Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm
Crash Landon- unknown, (possibly a Navy Commendation Medal with Combat V)
Frank Gerwe- unknown
Jim Kuzmick- individual Air Medal with combat V, Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm


If any of you can locate your individual Air Medal citation or Gallantry Cross citation (translated in to English) and scan it or take apicture of it with your IPhone, it would be valuable in finishing up the details in VA-82's participation in the Battle of Mo Duc on September 17th, 1972.

Here is a copy of a portion of Jim Yeager's Gallantry Cross with Palm citation






If you would like to read the letter from the OV 10 "Covey" Forward Air Controllers to the Commanding Officer, USS America documenting that the A7s had "Saved the Day"click here.


Charlie Sapp


Charlie Sapp got his wings in March, 1967 and was plowed back to VT-3 at Whiting Field as a formation instructor in his" beloved T-28".  Coming up for orders in July, 1968, he submitted a request for jet transition which was denied. However, he was recommended for a new squadron being formed Light Attack Squadron Four (VAL-4) to provide Close Air Support for Navy units in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam. Charlie volunteered and the Navy accepted.

The coastal areas of the Mekong Delta had been neutralized but most of the central 'Delta" was Viet Cong (VC) country. ADM Zumwalt who was Commander Naval Forces Vietnam needed to get the Delta "under control" so the Navy borrowed 18 brand new factory fresh OV-10s from the Marines; 4 stayed at NAS North Island, California for replacement pilot training. The rest went to Vietnam equally divided between Vung Tau, the Army airfield on the coast (and R&R area) and Binh Thuy in the central Mekong Delta.

Note Binh Thuy in the central Mekong Delta and Vung Tau in the extreme northeast on the coast

Charlie flew his first combat flight in the OV-10 on April 11, 1969 and his last on November 27th.  In nine months, he flew 211 combat missions (405 "green hours" half of which were at night). He flew from Vung Tau from April through July and then flew from Binh Thuy for the rest of his tour. During that time VAL-4 lost five pilots and three aircraft. Charlie was hit only once during his tour.




Lt Charlie Sapp with his trusty OV-10
(colorized by Ray Thomas)
Charlie's favorite picture of an OV-10 painted by
R.G.Smith who flew with Charlie in a combat configured OV-10
Charlie's favorite weapon, 5" Zuni rockets. They also could carry 2.75" rockets and guns.

I don't remember if we took advantage of Charlie's expertise in close air support by having him relate in formal ready room training what lessons he learned as an OV-10 attack pilot in VAL-4. Perhaps there were informal discussions amongst the junior officer pilots with Charlie about what it was like flying the OV-10 in the Mekong Delta flying close air support missions. I hope so.  We could have had Charlie discuss OV-10 FAC controlled close air support after we left the line after our second line period on October 8th before our liberty call in Singapore. We had a great opportunity to and from Singapore to conduct this training. It would have been valuable considering the substantial close air support missions we would fly with OV-10 Covey FACs after October 23rd. Perhaps we didn't know that Linebacker I was going to end on October 23rd (one day after we began our 3rd line period).

Charlie Sapp's comments about how the Mo Duc close air support went down.

"Mo Duc was ripe for a major screw up. I don't know why Covey 111 was personally engaging the bad guys (probably because the North Vietnamese were about to overrun the South Vietnamese troops in the village) when we were inbound but once we were on site he should have backed out of his light attack mode {2.75" fleshette rockets and M-60 guns} and shifted over to controlling and making best use of the significant resources at his disposal. He was gutsy but not wise, and he might not have lost his aircraft".

We (the Navy OV-10 Broncos) were the only fixed wing TACAIR authorized by the USAF in country to deliver ordnance without a ground or airborne controller.  We actually operated more under helo ROE (Rules of Engagement). We dealt directly with the customer on the ground, be it a SEAL team in a fire fight or a couple of patrol boats setting a night ambush on a canal along the Cambodian border. Outposts being overrun, especially at night in lousy weather, were our bread and butter.
Would Distinguished Flying Cross awards for some pilots' actions at Mo Duc be justified?

I asked Charlie if he thought the performance by some of the Maurauder pilots was heroic enough to qualify them for being awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross.
His response follows: "So, Mo Duc was very familiar to me and to lead a section into that setting and pull it off without a hitch, was more of an expectation more than an accomplishment {for me}. For the other guys who had precious little actual CAS experience, they probably should have been given some extra credit for good headwork in a tough, fluid situation. We used about a 25-30 degree delivery so we could better see the target details.  A FAC saying "Bomb my smoke" can be helpful {in some situations} but in this case we had to find the {bad} guys ourselves with our eyeballs. The NVA didn't seem to have any heavy AAA with them. I think 12.7 {machine guns} and a whole lot of 7.62 {AK-47s} was what they had to shoot at us. So, down we went to strafe the buildings used as staging areas {by the North Vietnamese troops}. Obviously, there was a "hail of fire" on every run, and running in five times on the same target was not the smartest thing to do. But it did seem to hold the NVA at bay until the next flights could get on station. Was that 'brave" enough to warrant a DFC?  Lets face it, we've seen DFCs given for a hell of a lot less.  I would not have turned one {DFC} down.




The mission of VAL-4 was to provide air support for US Naval Forces in the Mekong Delta

Most of the missions flown by VAL-4 OV10s was in support of of the US Naval Patrol Boats in the Delta.

However, VAL-4 also flew many missions in support of US Navy Seals (extractions in contact) and for ARVN Army units with US advisors


Down Amongst Them

In Support of Patrol Craft


Taxi Out of Bunker with Zuni Rockets Loaded

Take Off with Zuni Rockets

Firing a Zuni Rocket at the Target



A couple of Charlie Sapp OV-10 war stories





If you want to read a story about the extraction of a SEAL team in Cambodia;

"The Black Ponies at the Battle of Chheu Kachat", Click HERE.


Note: "The Black Ponies at the Battle of Chheu Kachat" by Charlie Sapp, Captain, USN Ret. has not been published, until now!



"Flying Black Ponies"

The Navy's Close Air Support Squadron in Vietnam

Kit Lavell

Naval Institute Press


If you want to read about another Charlie Sapp SEAL extraction mission, this time in the Mekong Delta,

read "Thy Neighbor's Keeper", from "Flying Black Ponies",

Click HERE.



Back to My Logbook


September 17th- I was not involved in any of the Mo Duc follow up missions. I flew a non combat post maintenance test flight (2.3 hours) in the morning.

September 17th- I led a night strike (2.1 hours), 4 mk 82s and 2 Mk 20 Rockeyes, on a ZSU 23-4 gun position on Isle de Cac Ba. no BDA


The DaNang Caper

Unfortunately, one of the A7 pilots on the Mo Duc missions on September 17th,  lost control of his aircraft on landing.  It had rained recently at DaNang and there were puddles of water on the runway. The wet runway and the fact that the higher than normal aircraft tire pressures used in aircraft carrier made the tires harder than normal resulted in hydroplaning and a side to side instability (we call that the "kitty car effect"). The bottom line was that the aircraft's left wing dug in the mud as the plane left the runway.  The pilot thought that the A7 was going to flip over. So, he ejected. He was not injured but the aircraft received substantial damage.

The ship launched the COD (Carrier Onboard Delivery) to fly to DaNang to pick up the pilot.  Lt Charlie Sapp was on that COD as he was the squadron's Safety Officer. He was sent to DaNang to determine the factors that were responsible for the mishap.


We also sent a maintenance team consisting of our Maintenance Material Officer, Nick Nickens, AMH1 Rothenberger, and four or five other maintenance personmnel to determine if repair of the damaged aircraft was feasible. The team determined that the aircraft was beyond our capability to repair and recommended that we "salvage" every usable black box and other parts (called "cannibalizing") and bring the parts back to the ship to use as spare parts for our combat aircraft. I recommended that we do exactly that and we authorized the Maintenance team to cannibalize the aircraft especially the computer, doppler, heads up display, radar, cockpit guages, the M 61 gun etc. The ship sent a COD to pick up the team and the parts. We would have removed the engine if we could have loaded it in the COD.

This is how Nick Nickens described his trip to DaNang

When we arrived at DaNang, we received a briefing on how we would evacuate the base if we needed to. The brief was simple, if you missed the last fight out, just run to the end of the runway and swim as far out as possible and a boat would pick you up. Really, not very reassuring! After the brief, we spent most of the day locating the aircraft, finding transportation, and lodging for the crew.  We then started the salvaging work. When we finally got to bed that night, loud noises woke us up. We soon found out there were incoming rockets. After locating the rest of the guys and spending most of the night in a bunker with a 45 across my lap, the night quickly went away. It seemed like we were in a Audie Murphy war movie with all the small arms fire, the explosions of the rockets, and the helicopters overhead. I do not remember how many times that happened. It does not seem like we were there very long because we stayed pretty busy and were anxious to get the stay over with. We were able to salvage everything we thought was suitable and eagerly returned to the ship. Needless to say, the experience was very interesting and memorable."
 
And Now, "The Rest of the Story"

We sent Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic Fleet (COMNAVAIRLANT) a message reporting that we had abandoned the aircraft at DaNang.  I expected that COMNAVAIRLANT would arrange through COMFAIRWESTPAC for the plane to be towed through the city of DaNang and be loaded on to a surface ship to be returned to the east coast and eventually end up at the Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF) located at NAS Jacksonville. I knew that it would take along time to accomplish that and we would all be long gone before the aircraft arrived at NARF.  Actually, I expected that the Viet Cong might even attack the aircraft as it was being towed through DaNang and that the plane would burn up and be destroyed.

Not so fast. The plane made it through DaNang and on to a ship and eventually back to the NARF (Naval Aircraft Rework Facility) in Jacksonville. When the people at NARF inventoried the aircraft, they documented all the missing parts and instituted an investigation.  It took quite awhile for that investigation to to arrive at COMNAVAIRLANT headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia; about two years. When it did, I happened to be the A7 Class Desk Officer (Code 521B) at AIRLANT and received the investigation for action; how convenient!  I explained what happened to my boss CDR Jim Anderson (Code 521) and then his boss, Capt Bill Finneran (Code 52) and eventually the big boss, RADM Faulders (Code 50). RADM Faulders thought we did the reasonable thing under the circumstances and the investigation "went away".


Lightning strike: Terry Ede's experience flying my wing in a thunderstorm.

Terry left the states and flew into DaNang about the same time as Nick Nickens and his crew were removing the "combat spare parts" from or damaged A7C.
Terry was flown from DaNang to Cubi Point where he did some FCLP flights with the CAG LSO (Dan Ryder). After successfully competing his FCLPs, he flew on the COD out to the America. Terry flew one of his first flight from Yankee One with me. Sometime during the flight, we were conducting a "fresh water wash down" of our aircraft by flying through dense rain in a Cummulo Nimbus cloud. The visibility in the cloud was near zero so Terry had to fly a few feet from my starboard wing tip light to maintain position. All of a sudden, I felt an electrical current in my thumb which was placed on the trim button. The "Chinese Hat" was missing so the trim button consisted of a screw.  I had a hole in my glove so the trim button screw was in contact with my thumb. When I felt an "electrical buzz", I took my thump off the trim button screw abut the same time I was hit by a bolt of lightning which passed through me, out my right arm, then out my right wing and made a direct hit on Terry in his cockpit. He bailed out to the right (loosing flight integrity). Eventually, we joined up and returned to the ship without any injury or damage to either aircraft.

How did we replace lost aircraft?

I really do not know the answer to that question. But, I can know what I would have done had I been the A7 Class Desk Officer at AIRLANT.  As I was in that job two years later working with Jim McConnell who was at AIRLANT in the same job in June 1972, I have  a good idea what they would have done.  The AIRLANT policy was to have four replacement like configured A7Es assigned to the RAG, VA174, where they were flown and kept operationally ready. If one of the squadrons deployed to the Mediterranean lost an aircraft, a replacement aircraft was flown from Jacksonville to Rota, Spain and then on to the base in the Med where it could be flown on to the carrier.

But that plan wouldn't work for our A7Cs. VA-174 had replacement A7Cs in the RAG which they were using to train some pilots who were bound to one of our squadrons. LCDR Frank Gerwe was one of those pilots. While the America was in her 30 day transit to WESTPAC, Frank Gerwe was getting A7C training. He was then flown to Cubi Point to meet the squadron in time for our first line period. It would be impractical to fly A7C replacement aircraft to Cubi Point in the Philippines. The only practical solution would have been to fly four to six properly configured aircraft from Jacksonville to NAS Norfolk to be loaded on board America to be transported to Cubi Point. The ship could not operate normally with those four to six extra aircraft. Deck loading would have made it difficult to use the hangar deck efficiently. But, they could be offloaded at Cubi and parked there to be available if needed. As VA-82 and VA-86 lost a total of at least five aircraft and I didn't notice that we were short of aircraft for long after each loss, I suspect some sort of scheme was used to allow us to operate with 12 aircraft shortly after each loss. 


September 18th- 1.1 hours, 4 MK 20 Rockeyes and 20 mm, Route Package 2 road recce
September 18th- 2.1 hours, 4 MK 82s, Route Package 3 recce.


Route Package Three Day road reconnaissance missions were a lot of fun as long as the weather was good and you stayed clear of the SAMS from Thasnh Hoa and Vinh.
There was occasional 37/57 AAA though so you had to stay above 4000ft and above 420 knots airspeed.

VA-86 lost an aircraft and a pilot on a Route Package Three recce. The pilot ejected and landed in the water just of Cape Falaise.


September 19th- 2.4 hours, 6 MK 82s, night recce Route Package 2
September 19th- 2.1 hours, 4 MK 82s, road recce Route Package 2
September 20th- 1.9 hours, 6 MK 82s, night recce Route Package 2

September 20th- Restrike of the Vinh petroleum storage area

I was not on this strike. But, it was a chance for Lt Ray Thomas to demonstrate his light attack skills in combat.




Ray was recommended for an Individual Air Medal (Bronze Star in lieu of the first award)

 
The Individual Air Medal is indicated by the bronze star to the left. The numeral #1 indicated the wearer of this Air Medal also has one Strike Flight Air Medal.




September 21st, 2.0 hours, 6 MK 82s, night recce Route Package 2        23 rd Strike Flight Air Medal
September 21st, 0.6 hours, night recovery tanker
September 22nd- 2.4 hours, 6 MK 82s, night MERSHIP mission
September 22nd- 1.6 hours, 10 MK 82s, Route Package 2 road recce

Night recces in all the Route Packages were challenging.
But, there are several aspects of these missions which are of interest.

1. Air to Ground night bombing.  Yankee Station pilots experimented with bombing with flares in 1966 and 1967 and found that it was dangerous and ineffective. There was normally too much haze which absorbed the flare illumination. It was dangerous primarily because it was very vertigo disorienting  for the pilots. And, it was difficult to find any useful targets on the ground.  However, the A7C/E aircraft had a computer toss bombing mode that used with the heads up display made accurate bomb deliveries possible. You still couldn't visible find targets. But, you could enter predetermined coordinates for bridges and AAA sites into the Corsair 11's computer and accurately toss bomb those coordinates. And, you could do it relatively safe altitudes.  A fun tactic was to toss a couple of MK 82s at a predetermined military target and then get back to altitude and watch for any AAA flashes on the ground. If there were some, the pilot could put the aiming diamond of the heads up display on the ground position of the AAA and toss bomb a couple of Mk 82s at the AAA site. This tactic was good for 3 runs with 6 MK 82s aboard, 4 runs with 8 Mk 82s aboard.  I always had a specific AAA site in the vicinity of the Thanh Hoa bridge (that I had developed a personal relationship with) to toss a couple of MK 82s at if I had a couple of MK 82s left at the end of my mission. This tactic was not possible with the A4 Skyhawk or A7A/B aircrfat.

2. Night SAM launches.  A SAM could lift off in Route Package 6B and you would think it was coming after you in Route Package 4. It was a spectacular sight.
So, you had to be constantly vigilant of your EW environment making sure you were ready to evade a SAM if one came your way. Again the A7C/E aircraft had a big advantage over the older A4 Skyhawks and A7 A/Bs. Executing a SAM evasive maneuver on instruments at night was a challenging affair with the older aircraft.
And, when you were finished the maneuver, it was difficult to know where you were and to get back to any semblance of night Yankee Station normal.  The anti SAM maneuver wasn't that much easier with the A7C/E except that the heads up display made it easier to execute the maneuver and keep the approaching SAM in sight. The big difference was when you completed the maneuver the heads up display told you where to head to get back to the mission.

3. Observing A6 "Flight of the Intruder Missions".  At night when flying Route Package Four or 6B recces, you could plainly see A6 low level missions enroute to their targets at Haiduong or Hanoi. All you had to do was watch the fireworks of the AAA as they engaged to A6 enroute to their targets. It wa possib;e sometimes to mark the position of one of the AAA sites that had engaged the A6 and to toss a couple of MK 82s at that site after the A6 had left the area.

After all that excitement and your mission was complete, it was now time to return to the ship for that night trap. OMG!


September 23rd- 1.3 hours, 6 MK 83s (VT fuses), Flack suppressor division lead for major strike at Cam Pha port facility.


The flight time of this mission (1.3 hours) indicates that the ship was in the Alpha Strike flex deck mode instead of cyclic operations.
I don't remember what the target was at Cam Pha (northeast of Haiphong) but it was a major port facility and would have had numerous military targets.




September 24th- 2.2 hours, 6 MK 82s, night recce Route Package 3
September 26th- 2.21 hours, 10 MK 82s, back to Quang Tri for CAS/DAS with FAC 146        260 combat missions

September 27th- 1.7 hours, 10 MK 82s, recce Route Package 2

These are examples of the kind of BDA photography we worked with for our road recce flights.
Notice there are lots of bomb craters from previous flights.

It was quite a trick finding locations where they would park their trucks during the daytime. It was difficult to see much from 3,000 ft.and 420 kts airspeed.  But, if you got much lower or slower, you were risking getting hit with 12.7 machine gun fire or even 7.62 AK-47 rounds.

Even if you got a direct hit on the road or bridge, they would use an alternate or just regrade the dirt back to fill in the bomb crater.

This next photo shows how they were able to operate freely during the Johnson bombing halt. This trans-shipment point is south of Vinh in Route Package Two.

The picture is self explanatory. Notice the shadow of the photo recon aircraft in the river! :-)


September 28th- 1.2 hours, 10 MK 36 Destructor Mines, division lead to seed the Vin Li River (good strike)

September 29th- 2.2 hours, 10 MK 82s, back to Quang Tri for CAS/DAS with FAC Covey 06
September 29th- 2.1 hours, 10 MK 82s, CAS/DAS with FAC Covey 117  (pinky landing)




These I Corps forward air controller associated with the Battle of Quang Tri often resulted in exciting
and worthwhile flights.

Most often we would orbit waiting to handed off to a FAC when we were needed. It was very gratifying to be able to provide close air support for troops in contact.

We had ideal bomb loads for these flights. Ten 500 lb MK 82s provided us with the ability to make 10 individual runs if we had enough fuel there was no significant AAA opposition. Or, we could make five runs dropping two bombs on each run and remaining above 3000 ft if there was opposition. If there were troops in close contact, we would fly lower of course!


My final flight in September was an exciting one.

September 30th- 1.4 hours, 2 AGM 45 Shrikes, 2 MK 20 Rockeye, Iron Hand mission which was diverted to Route Package 3 for RESCAP support,  fired 20 mm.
                                         
24th Strike Flight Air Medal



October, 1972

  I flew 17 flights in October (31.7 hours); 3 non combat flights and 14 combat missions:  for 284 total combat missions.
I logged 16 carrier landing (10 day, 6 night) for total of 238 America traps



October 1st- 1.6 hours, Iron Hand Recce Route Package Three
October 1st- 1.8 hours, two one point combat tanker sorties



Route Package 6B


More Operation Pocket Money Missions

October 4th- 1.3 hours, Mk 36 Destructor mines and 20mm, I lead a VA-82 4 plane division as part of a major mining strike at Ha Long Bay between Haiphong Harbor and Hon Gay

This mission consisted of four VA-86 aircraft lead by the Strike Leader, CDR Yonke.  I was the Division Leader of  Four VA-82 aircraft (Lt Yeager #2, LCDR Sapp #3, and LT Ray Thomas #4), and four VA-35 A6 aircraft. The mining aircraft were loaded with MK 36 Destructor mines. There were two to four flak suppressor aircraft with Rockeyes. The mining aircraft encountered heavy 37/57mm AAA fire in the target area. The flak suppressors engaged the AAA with their Rockeyes and suppressed the AAA considerably.  We had to abort our first run due to the AAA but were able to return and make an accurate second run.



Photo provided by Ray Thomas

Below is a photograph of Destructor mines being seeded from by an A7 aircraft in the vicinity of Hon Gai on October 4th, 1972.
Lt Ray Thomas as VA-82's Weapons Training Officer along with Fred Ameel, VA-86's Weapons Training Officer, assisted CDR Yonke in planning the mission.


Photo provided by Ray Thomas

During egress from the Ha Long Bay, my section (Jim Yeager and I) were vectored by Alpha Whiskey to investigate a "lucrative target" in the Haiphong harbor inlet. When we arrived on scene, I spotted a North Vietnamese patrol craft which it turned out was a WUHV class covered lighter armed with a 12.7 mm machine gun {later identified by USS America intelligence personnel). I made a strafing run on the boat and received fire from the vessel. After my strafing run, the boat made an erratic 270 degree turn and went dead in the water. 




All four of my flight were recommended for awards

I was recommended for an Individual Air Medal for this mission but it was downgraded to my 9th NCM.








Alpha Strikes


October 5th- 1.5 hours, 10 MK 82s, Phu Ly Railroad Spur, VA-82 division lead, part of an Alpha Strike that successfully dropped a span of the Phy Ly Railroad and Highway bridge.                    My 270th combat mission


October 6th was a huge day. VA-82 participated in two major strikes.


Thanh Hoa Bridge (AKA Dragon's Jaw)

According to Wikipedia, a total of 873 sorties were flown against the Thanh Hoa bridge between 1065 and October 6th, 1972. Considerable damage was accomplished  during Operation Rolling Thunder in 1966 and 1967. But, the bridge was repaired during the Johnson bombing halt and was operational at the beginning of Linebacker one in 1972.  President Nixon ordered an aggressive bombing campaign against the Thanh Hoa bridge in 1972.
Three of these missions flown against the bridge were especially significant!

April 27th, 1972-Twelve USAF F4D Phantoms were tasked to attack the bridge. Eight of these aircraft had 2000# Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs).
        BDA- The bridge was dislodged from its western abutment dropping it into the water.



May 13th, 1972- Four USAF F4D with 2000# LGBs targeted the center pillar supporting the center span of the bridge.
                        BDA- The bridge was rendered useless.

October 6th, 1972- Six VA-82 aircraft from the USS America targeted the center pillar supporting the center span of the bridge.
                        BDA- At least one of the 2400# MK2 Walleye
TV guided missiles hit the center pillar breaking the center span in half.
                               Additional damage was done by two VA-82 aircraft with 2000# MK84 bombs.

 


I don't know what numbers and types of aircraft were actually assigned the mission.

Six A7Cs from VA-82 were flown to attack the bridge. Four aircraft were the primary strike aircraft: two aircraft with 2400# MK2 Walleyes  and two with Mk 84 2000# bombs. A third section (2 aircraft) were loaded with the smaller version of the Walleye in case the primary section was unable to strike the target.

I suspect there were some flak suppressor aircraft involved as well as the usual
VAQ 132 EA6B Prowler for EW support.

An RA5C Vigilante from RVAH 6 on America flew an high speed Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) of the srrike.

A VAQ 124 E2C Hawkeye would coordinate with the PIRAZ ship to ensure the BARCAP were not diverted from their primary mission and to help clear strike aircraft back to the Yankee Station air defense identification zone following the strike.

Note: The primary strike aircraft carried two 2400# MK2 Walleyes; one primary weapon and one back up weapon in the event that the first walleye didn't check out. Only one weapon for each primary Walleye aircraft was intended for actual use. A large amount of smoke and material are produced by a 2400# Walleye denotation making it impossible for a follow-up Walleye attack. This smoke and dust does not affect MK84 2000# bomb effectiveness.


MK2 2400# Walleye

MK 84 2000# bombs

MK 84 2000# bombs exploding in North Vietnam

BDA
Before

After





The BDA photo on the left taken on October 6th after the strike clearly shows that at least one of the supports for the bridge has been destroyed causing a portion of the bridge to fall into the river making it impassable.





The close up above shows that a large section of the bridge on the northwest side has collapsed into the water and that in addition there was considerable damage to the bridge itself.





The division leader for planning and execution of the strike and the leader of the two plane section carrying the 2400# Mk2 Walleyes was LCDR Leighton "Snuffy" Smith. His wingman who was also carrying two 2400# MK2 Walleyes was Ltjg Marv Baldwin.

The section leader of the two MK82 2000# bomb aircraft was the squadron Commanding Officer, CDR Don Sumner. His wingman was Ltjg Jim Brister.

Note: CDR Sumner was not the strike leader because Snuffy Smith was the strike leader for a similar strike planned for October 4th which was cancelled.

The section Leader for the backup Walleye section was Lt Ray Thomas. His wingman was Lt Gary Tabbert.



Analysis of the TV tape from Ltjg Marv Baldwin's VA-82 aircraft showed that his Walleye made a direct hit on one of the pillars supporting the center span of the bridge causing the main span of the bridge to collapse!  

LTjg Baldwin was awarded a DFC for this mission.  His MK 2 Walleye that was a direct hit on the main support structure at the center of the bridge was documented by video tape from the Walleye TV camera.
  



In 2019, Stephen Coontz and Barrett Tilman published this book , "Dragon's Jaw" which is a history of USAF and Navy attempts to  destroy the Thanh Hoa Bridge from 1965 through 1972.
"

Chapter 20,
"We Dropped the Bridge" (pages 247-256), describes  the mission on October 6th, 1972 where four VA-82 A7C's are credited with dropping the center span of the bridge with two aircraft, "Snuffy" Smith and Marv Baldwin) using 2400# MK2 Walleye TV guided "smart" bombs and two aircraft loaded with MK84 #2000 lb "dumb bombs" (CDR Don Sumner and Ltjg Jim Brister).

Pages 254 and 255 describe the BDA mission flown by Joe Satrapa flying an RA-5C Vigilante.


DFC


LCDR Leighton "Snuffy" Smith was awarded a
DFC for planning and executing the mission.

The book implies that the DFC was inadequate for the mission that dropped the Thanh Hoa Bridge
and that it should have been a Silver Star.


I bet the USAF F4 pilots who successfully knocked the bridge from its western abutment received at least Silver Stars.


Silver Star

 

The VA-82 Marauders Thanh Hoa "Bridge Busters" October 6th, 1972
 


Left to Right: Ltjg Jim Brister, LtJg Marv Baldwin, CDR Don Sumner, LCDR Leighton "Snuffy" Smith
This picture is an IPhone screen shot I took from Steven Coonts' book, "Dragon's Jaw"
which was then colorized by Ray Thomas using Photo Shop Elements 2020 software

There were 11 aircraft lost during the 873 sorties flown targeting the Thanh Hoa Bridge between 1967 and 1972.

Rear Admiral John S. Christiansen, Commander Carrier Division Seven embarked in USS America
sent the following message to the America and the embarked air wing with copies to
 COMSEVENTHFLEET, COMNAVAIRLANT, and to all aircraft carriers on Yankee Station




October 6th, 1972
Do Xa Railroad Bridge
(about 8 miles south of Hanoi)

I was the strike leader for this strike.

I would like to thank Jim "Rock" Yeager and Ray Thomas who flew with me on this strike and provided some of the details of the strike!



 
The chart below is the actual combat chart I used for the strike.



October 6th, 1.4 hours, 4 Mk 83s, Alpha Strike lead, about 8 miles south of Hanoi


The following is a description of the strike tactics we used to the best of my memory, inputs from Rock and Ray, some "educated guesswork", and a combat chart I found recently in my garage that I used for this strike.

I planned the route to the target to try to indicate to the North Vietnamese defenses that we were going to restrike the Phu Ly railroad bridge and yard area strike I flew on the day before.

I do not recall how many aircraft were scheduled for this strike. At a minimum, the strike group would have most likely consisted of the following aircraft:  four VA-82 A7C bombers with five MK-83 boms each, two A6 bombers (with Mk-83s), at least two sections (possible 6) Iron Hand (Hanoi strikes normally required three 2 plane sections), one EA6B Prowler, one E2C Hawkeye, and 4 BARCAP./MIGCAP . VA-82 would have to have provided 8 aircraft for the strike; my division of 4 bombers and 4 Iron Hand aircraft, VA-86 might have provided four flak suppressors and two Iron Hand aircraft. The pilots in my division were me as lead, Rock as my wingman (#2), Dan Ryder (CAG 8 LSO as the section leader. #3), and Ray Thomas as #4.


Our route (on the combat chart I found) was to coast in a little south of the Red River at the inlet at Moc Duc. We then proceeded northwest between Ninh Binh on the left and Nam Dinh on the right staying south of the 85/100mm AAA at Nam Dinh.  If I followed my normal tactics, our altitude at coast in would have been would have been 15,000-16,000.  A few minutes after I heard some "S" band conical scan AAA radar (Firecan/Flapwheel), I would have started a climb to 18,000". to be above the expected 37/57mm barrage fire from Phy Ly or in the vicinity of Hanoi. By being at a lower altitude at coast in and climbing after I detected the first conical scan radars, my hope was that they would "cut" their fuses for our coast in altitude rather than our actual altitude (2,000 to 3,000ft higher than our coast in altitude).

Note: The North Vietnamese liked to use acquisition radars (Barlock and Spoonrest) to identify the track of inbound strike groups and then use AAA radars to determine the strike group's altitude.

We planned a route to be south west of Phy Ly and then turn to the north indicating that the target might be Phu Ly.  Note: Our turn point was over the southern part of a karst ridgeline which provided an excellent topographic feature to identify visually as the turn point and also enable the flight members to remember the area as a good place to eject should it be necessary. Once abeam Phu Ly, rather than turn in to the east , we proceeded to our target about five miles to the north.

A section of Iron Hand would have been dedicated to the Phu Ly area and one southeast of Hanoi over the Red River.  If we had six Iron Hand aircraft, I would have stationed them out in front of the bomber group ready to engage the first SAMs fired from Nam Dinh, Phu Ly, or Hanoi. The BARCAP, under E2C control would have been southeast of Hanoi between the strike group and the Phuc Yen and Kep MIG bases providing MIGCAP for the strike group and the Hanoi Iron Hand section.

At least one of the VF 74 F4 BARCAP had to be on our strike frequency as they were tasked to give us a target weather brief (in code). The target weather that day was "Iffy", questionable, a significant factor. The weather at our enroute altitude was fine. But, there was quite a bit of haze at low altitude which became a scattered to broken layer at 4,000 feet which got worse as we got further away from the coast.

We heard some Firecan/Flapwheel conical scan radars coming from Nam Dinh so started a climb as planned. Once at altitude, we would have changed heading about every four to six seconds. If we received any 85/100mm AAA, we would have deployed some chaff and hope that our ALQ gear was "doing it's thing".
I don't think that we received much AAA until we approached Phu Ly.  Even then, we were above most of it! To the best of my memory, I don't think we encountered any SAMs from Phu Ly.

But when we approached the Do Xa Rairoad Bridge about 8 miles south of Hanoi, that changed. My responsibility was to get the target in sight as soon as possible so that we could execute our bre-briefed bombing tactic without delay.  It was difficult. Our VF 74 BARCAP had given a "Go code word" for the target weather. It was great "fighter pilot weather", clear from 4,000' up. But the weather in the target area there was a broken cloud layer at 4,000 ft which made it difficult to get the target in sight. Our A7C/E navigation system heads up display indicated the target. But, all I saw was the tops of the clouds.  Making it more difficult was that were opposed by SAMs as we approached the target area.


Fansong B Radar

SA-2 Guideline missile

As the bomber sections began to make anti SAM maneuvers, I continued to look for the target. My section leader Dan Ryder called for me to "break right" to avoid a SAM that was tracking our division. I did not want to break yet because my responsibility was to locate the target. Dan repeated his "break" call.  It turned out that we had three SAMs fired at our section. The 4,000' layer gave us less time to initiate our anti SAM maneuver as the SA 2 Guideline accelerated quickly to our altitude (15,000 at roll in).

Ray Thomas


Ray Thomas made an audio recording of the flight.


To listen to the critical two minutes of our SAM encounters, click on




The low warble" is our EW gear telling us that we have Fansong B locked on to our flight.
The term "Shotgun"
is an Anti SAM Iron Hand aircraft firing a Shrike missile at one of the SAM sites
The "high warble" is our EW gear telling us that there is a SAM in the air enroute to us as the target.

 If you listen carefully, you can hear the three separate SAM "low warble" to "high warble" indications of the three SAMs that targeted us! I think that we were engaged by two SAM sites; one that fired one Guideline missile from the right of our flight from the vicinity of Phu Ly causing Dan Rather (#3) to make a"break right call (that missile passed between me and Rock but did not detonate); next we were engaged by two SAMs from the Hanoi area, I broke down and to the to avoid these missiles, one passed over us, the other passed under our section.,

I was forced to abandon my target search to avoid the SAMs that had us targeted. Ray Thomas says that he saw a SAM passed between the two aircraft in our lead section.sections.  Jim Yeager says that it passed between our aircraft so close that he could feel the vibrations and rumble as the missile passed between us. I don't think that that SAM detonated. The distance between a flight lead in VA-82 and his wingman (combat cruise) was typically back in a 45-60 degree cone with about 700 feet of separation. Jim "Rock" Yeager was an experienced combat wingman who understood the importance of a wingman maintaining flight integrity.  The tactical combat cruise position not only allows the experienced wingman an ideal position to fly with his lead in any maneuvering situation but also happens to be the optimum distance where the Fansong SA2 Guideline control radar has a difficult time in determining whether the target is a large aircraft or two smaller aircraft. If this cannot be resolved, the missile will not detonate. Perhaps this was the case for the initial SAM that passed between us.

I had to break left to avoid two SAMs which passed very close to our section; one about 1,000ft. above us and one below us. Both of these SAMs detonated.  The best angle for a SAM to be effective is a"tail shot" from the 6 o'clock position. If the target aircraft can can keep the SAM abeam and with some "G" on the aircraft, it is difficult for the SAM (small wings; fast speed) to match the turn and if it detonates, most of the frag pattern will go away from the target.We continued our SAM evasive maneuver but were able to release our bombs using our heads up display using the toss maneuver. We were unable to get a visual BDA of the accuracy of our bombs due to the cloud layer.

We thought we had "lucked out" in that we didn't think either of us had received any damage.  We didn't notice any obvious damage off the target during our egress toward the coastline. I do not remember which bombers dropped their MK 83s in the target area or which aircraft proceeded to secondary targets and then exited either along the Red River or back along our enroute track.  Rock and I remained near the coast but "feet wet"with our RESCAP Spads until all the strike aircraft were safe. The E2 let me know that everyone was enroute the ship except the BARCAP which remained under control of the E2 and the PIRAZ ship.

Once "feet wet", we checked each others aircraft out for damage.  Jim didn't notice any damage on my aircraft and all my systems were working fine.  I didn't see any damage on Rock's aircraft.  However, when Rock's aircraft was checked after landing, it had a hole through the leading edge flap on his right wing.  We were very lucky that day that either Rock or I didn't get lethal damage from one of the SAMs (or both of us)!







This is how my wingman,
Jim Yeager describes the flight

I have entered some amplifying comments in green.

 "The weather at our altitude on ingress was clear and unrestricted. I don't remember where we coasted in, but I think somewhere near the "hour glass". We started getting low and high prf fansong pretty early on (vicinity of Nam Dinh) lasting just long enough to prompt a response from the iron hand. Jerry Breast (our VA-82 XO) was the iron hand lead but I don't remember if we had one section or two (We would have had at least two iron hand sections). In any event, the iron hand were out of shrikes before we got to the target, so they rolled back home. (I don't think that the iron hand departed the area before we were at the target.; note the "shotgun call on the audio recording indicating that a shrike was fired while we were engaged by the SAMs in the target area).

See my comments about Iron Hand tactics below! 


You
(me as the strike lead), detached the fighters to do their fighter sweep and give the call to continue to the primary target (the Do Xa bridge) or divert to the backup because of the weather. The weather was  fine (for the MIGCAP mission) but pretty crappy for seeing the targets on the ground and bombing them. So, we went on Do Xa on the advice of the fighters.

At some point as we got closer, fansong transitioned from singer low, then eventually singer high. I have to confess that as a well-trained and disciplined wingman, I never took my eyes off of my lead as much as I wanted to have a peak at the first singer low warble. The lead aircraft was maneuvering pretty aggressively at this point, and I just tried to hang on, maintain position, and not loose sight. I heard Dan Ryder (#3) transmit "break right, Streetcars, break right" as the as the high warble continued, and them you (me as lead) rolled and dove left. Just as you did so, I began to hear a deep rumbling sound. I started a roll-in and looked up through the canopy as the noise got louder and saw a missile go right over my head (between our two aircraft). At the same time, my airplane shook pretty badly like I had been thumped. I just continued the roll (assisted by the thump) and wound up very nose down looking for something that resembled our target. On retrospection, I was thrown around by the SAM's shockwave. When I looked down in my dive, all I saw were the tops of of a broken to overcast layer well below me, so I didn't waste much time trying to find the bridge and just pickled (released his bombs) and pulled. As I came off the target looking for you, I looked over my shoulder some lingering cloud from one of the SAMs in the salvo. It was gleaming white and looked like a dense poached egg hanging in the sky. We joined and we headed for the beach (coastline) and back home.

Just a few days later, we went to Singapore and when I arrived you said the TV news in the hotel broadcast a video that resembled our strike. The NV (North Vietnamese) were claiming that they had launched three SAMs at at two A7s and showed three SAMs bracketing two airplanes.  The North Vietnamese claimed claimed that the two aircraft were shot down."

There were no awards recommended for this flight.
Everyone did their job and the flight was opposed by AAA and SAMs, but no BDA due to weather.


A few comments about Iron Hand weapons load and tactics

Iron Hand weapons loads and tactics had changed radically between Rolling Thunder (1965-1967) and Linebacker 1 in 1972 due to the Johnson bombing halt which restricted bombing North Vietnam north of Route Package Two. As Weapons Training Officer in VA-15 in 1967 and as our squadron was the dedicated Iron Hand squadron for the air wing, I was charged with developing our Anti-SAM tactics. Check out my chapter on VA-15 Circa 1967 for the details. But basically, we deployed our Iron Hand sections out in front of the main body armed with two AGM 45 Shrike anti radiation missiles and two LAU 10 pods (eight 5" Zuni rockets). Our policy was that we could expend one Shrike during the ingress of the main strike group but would keep at least one Shrike each to use when the strike group was at the target or on their egress from the target. Note: The strike aircraft were very vulnerable to SAMs during egress because SAMs were very effective from behind the target aircraft. In lieu of firing a Shrike, we would launch a 5" rocket simulating a Shrike. This was effective in the beginning. The NVM eventually figured it out but we still could use the Zunis in direct attack pof a SAM site (our guns were ineffective). We would never egress from our assigned areas until the strike group was out of harms way.

This changed during the "Johnson bombing halt". The North Vietnamese increased the number of AAA guns significantly.  The Russians conducted training of the North Vietnamese SAM Regiments including the use of fire control radars to provide initial target tracking reducing the amount of time that they needed to use the Fansong radar early in the engagement. This reduced the vulnerability of the Fansong to Iron Hand Shrike missiles. In addition, the Russians trainned the NVN missile control officers in using two or more Fansong radars and associated missile sites in coordinated engagement of strike aircraft. (I think this was the case in our October 6th strike at the Do XA Bridge). In addition, the North Vietnamese deployed many Russian built ZSU 23 quad mounted 23mm mobile weapons in the vicinity of high value targets, along the ingress and egress routes, and in the vicinity of SAM sites. Iron Hand aircraft could no longer orbit a SAM site at 12,000 feet waiting for the site to launch and then shoot a Shrike "down the throat" or attack the site with Zuni rockets.  The ZSU 23 would pick you off at that altitude. Iron Hand aircraft would have to launch their Shrikes ion to a "basket" at a safe distance from the missile site. Also, due to the USS Forestal and USS Coral Sea fires caused by Zuni rockets, the LAU 10 Zuni rockets were no longer used on aircraft carriers 1972. Our Iron Hand load was two AGM-45 Shrikes and two MK 20 Rockeyes.  We had only two Shrikes per aircraft and no Zunis to simulate Shrike launches. The rockeyes were highly effective in attacking a SAM site along with our M61 20mm gun. (However, the Iron Hand aircraft were not able to conduct any rockeye attacks on SAM sites on the October 6th strike due to the cloud layer obstructing view of the sites!) 

Experienced Iron Hand pilots would never expend both Shrikes before the strike group got to the target! Instead, after firing one Shrike, they would monitor their assigned SAM site (s) with their EW equipment and their remaining Shrike staying as clear as possible of the ZSU-23s and AAA barrage fire. Only if the strike group were engaged by SAMs at the target would the Iron Hand pilot expend his last Shrike.  Also, it was desirable to keep one Shrike in the Iron Hand section to protect the strike aircraft during their egress from the target to the coastline as they were so vulnerable to SAMs fired at them from their 6 o'clock position.



October 7th, 1.8, Iron Hand recce, Route Package 4, Thanh Hoa, I expended 1 AGM- 45 Shrike



This was my last flight in our 57 day Second Line Period.

Henry Kissinger was in Paris negotiating with the North Vietnamese and felt that a peace agreement was imminent.
He announced that "Peace Was at Hand"

In order not to endanger the success of this peace initiative, President Nixon ordered a bombing halt above 20 degrees of latitude; just north of Thanh Hoa in Route Package Four.


On October 8th, we left Yankee Station for a brief stop in Cubi Point to off load damaged aircraft and load supplies. Then, we set sail for Singapore.
This would have been an ideal time to have conducted training with Charlie Sapp on how to operate with a Covey OV-10 FAC. There were signs that Linebacker One was going to end before our next line period so that Henry Kissinger's "Peace is at Hand" prediction would have a favorable political climate.


Singapore
 October 12th to October 20th


  Singapore was our only major liberty port of the deployment. Many of the Marauder wives (including Mary) traveled to Singapore to meet us there.

We stayed at a modern circa 1972 high rise tourist type hotel.

But if I had to do it again, I wold stay at a British colonial style hotel such as the Rafters Hotel pictured here.



Mary and I did spend some time at the beautiful vintage Rafters' bar where we sampled their famous Singapore Sling cocktail.

We actually sat in the porch attached to the bar enjoying their wicker porch fans similar to the ones pictured here.

We also walked and shopped in the bustling old town district where I purchased a very nice green translucent jade ring for Mary.






Singapore is a very modern city today.  But, I bet the old British historic colonial district is still there.


The America left Singapore on October 20th to return to Yankee Station for our Third Line Period
 
Mary flew from Singapore via Hong King on her flight back to the "states".
She traveled with Mary Frazier, Rock Yeager's girlfriend.
They took the Star Ferry to Kowloon and took the tram up to Victoria Peak.

Victoria Peak offers a spectacular view Kowloon and Victoria Island.



Operation Linebacker One concluded on October 22nd.

We began our 4th Line Period on October 22nd through December 1st


 
We did not fly any missions in Route Package 6B (Hanoi and Haiphong) during this line period as Operation Linebacker one had ended.

This was a political move to decrease the pressure on the North Vietnamese while Henry Kissinger was conducting peace negotiations. 

Most of our flights were flown in support of ground forces in the northern part of South Vietnam or on Pave Phantom missions which were radar controlled bomb drops on the wing of a USAF Pave Phantom aircraft along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
We flew some recce missions in Route Packages Two, Three, and the southern part of Route Package Four.

Unfortunately, we lost two pilots from VA-86, one in Route Package 3 and one near Than Hoa in Route Package Four during this period.

I wouldn't be surprised if the North Vietnamese knew about the restrictions in bombing in Route Package 6 during the negotiations and moved some AAA guns south into Route Packages 2, 3, and 4 making them more dangerous!


After October 23rd, we flew a few road recce missions in Route Packs Two, Three and the southern part of Route Pack 4 (below 20 degrees lattitude), MERSHIP missions, Close Air Support misiisions In I Corps in South Vietnam and Pave Phantom missions over the Ho Chi Minh Trail

I flew a total of 4 road recce missions; two in Route Pack 2 and two in Route Pack 3.

During this period, I flew 4 Close Air Support missions with Covey FACS, 6 missions with Nail FACS (Hue City) and 1 mission under the control of a Tom FAC.
In addition, I flew numerous combat tanker missions, 1 MERSHIP mission, 9 Pave Phantom missions, and one TACAN drop over Ho Chi MInh Trail.

According to my logbook, I flew one mission on November 15th  in Cambodia expending 8 MK 82s and 20mm (but no other details of the mission were recorded)


Logbook Entries

Ocotber 22nd, 2.2 hours, non combat flight, post maintenance test flight

October 23rd, 2.1 hours, 9 MK 82, CAS/DAS FAC Nail 25, South Vietnam, I Corps







Lcdr Jim "Sully" Sullivan

VA-86, A7C

KIA, October 23rd, 1972




Sully was on a day Recce of Route Package 3 when he was hit by AAA.  He managed to get his aircraft over the water before he was forced to eject just off the coast at Cape Falaise.
He was captured by a fishing boat but was alive as he was seen struggling with the fisherman as they pulled him into the boat.
The on scene commander (perhaps his wingman) had to depart due to low fuel.
However an SH3 helo arrived on the scene but was forced to leave after taking several rounds of small arms fire which caused the loss of one of the helo's engines.
A second SH3 helo arrived. The door gunner fired on the fishing boat causing the Vietnamese fishermen to dive over the side of the boat.  Lcdr Sullivan's body was observed face down in the boat. His body was not recovered at the scene or returned by the North Vietnamese.


Logbook Entries

October 24th, 2.0 hours,10 MK 82s,  South Vietnam CAS, I Corps, Covey 16
October 25th, 2.1 hours, 10 MK 82s, South Vietnam, CAS, I Corps, Covey 5

On both of these flights, I led a flight of 4 VA-82 aircraft loaded with 10 MK 82 500# bombs each. 
We were scheduled to fly close air support under the control of a forward air controller.

One Tank, One Bomb, Tank Gone!

Ray Thomas was the section leader on one of these flight and provided the following details.



We checked in with our Covey FAC with a flight of four with 10 MK 82s
each. On missions of this type, we would make repeated bomb runs dropping one or two bombs at a time as long as we didn't encounter any ground fire.
Covey told us that he had an enemy tank for us to attack. He told us to drop one bomb and then he would give us corrections to destroy the tank.
I had the tank in sight, and as lead made a run and dropped one bomb while the other three Marauders continued to orbit at roll in altitude.
My A7C weapons system was tight and scored a direct hit destroying the tank.
The Covey FAC was impressed. "Now we have to find a target for the rest of your 39 bombs" he said.



Advantages of the A7C/E over the A7 A/B or older A4 Skyhawk light attack aircraft in combat.

South Vietnam:

Day:
The A4 was an excellent bomber in the low threat environment of South Vietnam.  A4 pilots were well practiced in manual bombing and could consistently achieve a 25' CEP (Circular Error Probable) in attacking a target which was within the lethal range of a MK 82 bomb.  A4 pilots were capable of this accuracy as long as the conditions permitted dive angles that we had practiced, usually 30 or 35 degrees and 15 degrees. We were less accurate at achieving good results when we were forced to use dive angles that we hadn't practiced. Our minimum pullout altitude was dependent on the tactical situation. For direct support missions (bombing trees with a flare target), we might practice the 45 degree high release 3,500' minimum altitude bombing technique we would be using up north to hone our skills. For close air support missions with troops in contact we might adjust our minimum altitude to as low as 500' especially for napalm and strafing close to American troops.
The A4 usually carried a centerline fuel tank and two bomb racks which usually limited our time on station which was a disadvantage.
The A7 A/B had a weapons delivery system which when accurate provided the A7A/B pilot the ability to bomb accurately at any dive angle. If the weapons system was not working properly, the pilot had to use dive angles that he had practiced. A major advantage was that the A7 carried more fuel that the A4 and had more flexibility with time on station.
The A7C/E possessed an exceptional inertial navigation system and a heads up display that made it a considerably more accurate bomber than either the A4 or A7A/B. The "system" was usually reliable so A7C/E pilots were less trained at manual bombing. As a result, they were not as good at it as a skilled A4 pilot. The A7E with its TF41 engine excellent fuel characteristics could stay on station  longer that A4s but not quite as long as the more fuel efficient A7 A/B/Cs that had the Tf30P408 engine.
All these aircraft were limited to time on station by the schedule being used by an aircraft carrier conducting cyclic operations.

Night:
I did not fly at night in a close or direct air support mode. We did participate in level release bombing with a Pave Phantom aircraft or by dropping when the Pave Phantom's bombs released. Of course we had no idea what the target was or what kind of damage, if any.  We also were scheduled occasionally to drop bombs level at a predetermined altitude at a TACAN radial and distance. This, of course, was very inaccurate but was probably only intended to harass the enemy while they attempted to sleep along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

North Vietnam:
(Day road reconnaissance: (Route packages 2 and 3)

Day road reconnaissance missions were normally used as a warm up for the first few missions a pilot flew over the north where there was less of a SAM and large caliber radar controlled 57/85/100 AAA threat and no MIG threat. these flights would normally be conducted by a section (two aircraft). Pilots had to conduct road reconnaissance low enough to be able to identify targets (ie; trucks as opposed to water buffalo), bridges in tact vice destroyed, etc. Normally 3,500' was low enough for this purpose which kept the aircraft above small arms and 14.5 machine gun effective firing as long as the airspeed was 450 knots or so. Occasionally, some pilots would fly a bit lower to be able to see tire tracks leading into a clump of trees, a sign of a possible truck park. Once a target was identified, the aircraft would climb to a roll in altitude of 8,000' or so and use a 35 degree dive angle to attack the target (3,000' minimum altitude). These targets weer not worth loosing an aircraft. A4 Skyhawks could consistently get the dive angle we wanted in this situation, so our accuracy was excellent in these situations. However the A7 A/B's accuracy at flexible dive angles was still an advantage. Again, the exceptional accuracy of the A7C/E weapons system was even better.
Navigation and time on target was about the same for all types because the navigation was usually close to the coast and the time on over the beach was controlled by the requirement to be back at the ship for recovery time during cyclic operations. The difference was that the A4s came back to the ship with less fuel than the A7s.

Day road reconnaissance: (Route packages 4 and 6B)

Day road reconnaissance missions in Route Packages 4 and 6B were a different matter.  Although section leaders did their best to avoid SAM sites and large caliber radar controlled 57/85/100 AAA by staying clear of major population areas such as Than Hoa, Ninh Binh, Nam Dinh, and, of course Haiphong, road recce flight were sometimes the targets of SAMs and large caliber AAA. There was a 37mm optical AAA threat anywhere in in that part of North Vietnam.  Although there was only a  slight chance of MIGs, they did occasionally show up. As a result, I always conducted my high threat road recce flights with my wingman in a section position about 3,000' away so that we could both check each others tails and flanks for SAMs and AAA. If the flight leader had to initiate a hard turn to rapidly clear an area where the flight was receiving AAA or to evade a SAM, it was the wingman's responsibility to maintain section integrity and to return to the proper position slightly aft of beam of the leader.  The superior navigation system and having a heads up display gave the A7C/E a significant advantage over the A7 A/B and the A4 Skyhawk. Following a SAM break or any type extreme maneuvering, all an A7 C/E pilot need to do was turn his flight path marker toward the heading indicated in the system to the selected navigation point to get back to the desired track. The further from the coast the road recce track and the more severe the haze, the more significant his advantage was! Again, time on target was about the same for all types because the time on over the beach was controlled by the requirement to be back at the ship for recovery time during cyclic operations. The difference was that the A4s came back to the ship with less fuel than the A7s sometimes needing to get fuel from the recovery tanker.

Night road reconnaissance:
There were two types of night reconnaissance, without flares and with flares.

Night road reconnaissance missions without flares was basically useless if flown by A4 Skyhawks and almost as bad if flown by A7 A/B Corsairs. The only thing you could see was the coastline which appeared to be a light colored band in an otherwise black background. For the Skyhawks, navigation was a nightmare. For A7 A/B pilots, it wasn't much better. You could tell when you got close to SAM and AAA threats only by listening to your APR 25 EW receiver or when the enemy started shooting at you. A night SAM launch is a spectacular event. You think it may be coming at you when it's 20 miles away! If you could make out a target, you couldn't bomb it effectively. These were mostly sortie count missions.
But that wasn't true for the A7 C/E.  The navigation system told you where you were and what heading to fly to get to your next navigation point. If you entered the coordinates of known AAA or SAM sites in your recce region, you could always toss one MK 82 with the system on one of those coordinates by using the heads up display without flying below a reasonably safe altitude. If you were lucky enough to get a secondary explosion with one bomb, you could toss a couple more in there for effect. It gave you something reasonably worthwhile to do on the night recce before coming back to ship for the most challenging event of the mission, the night carrier landing.  Actually, night landings got easier the more you flew at night as long as the weather cooperated.

Night road reconnaissance missions with flares
was a controversial subject. Most airwings seem to agree that bombing above the flares was a waste of time if not dangerous. With the haze that seem to be always present, the world looked like a hazy fish bowl above the flares. You couldn't see anything under the flares.
And, it was easy for the pilot to get disoriented which was dangerous.
But bombing below the flares was thought to be an excellent tactic by some squadrons.  VA-153 1n 1966 flying A4Es were very successful in finding trucks at night using low altitude tactics at night under the flares.  Their pilots bought in to it and they became skillful. Their sister squadron, VA-155 wanted no part of it as did other airwings. On one night in 1966, a section of VA-152 found a line of trucks with their light on which was estimated to be two miles long. In my view, success in bombing under the flares was more dependent in the skill and willingness to use the tactic, not on which kind of airplane you happen to be flying.

Alpha Strikes including Iron Hand Missions:

Alpha Strikes and the Iron Hand support missions were the greatest test of allight attack pilot's nerve and skills.  The greater the distance the target was from the coast, the greater the challenge.  Hanoi targets provided the greatest test. For a wingman, the challenge was to stay with your leader at all cost and for the new guys, close on the leader in the bomb run and pickle your bombs when the leader pickled his.  For these pilots, it really didn't make much difference which type of aircraft you were flying.  But as the wingman gained experience, he was allowed to roll in with more separation from his leader and make his own bomb run.  In this situation, the A7 C/E was vastly superior to the A4 Skyhawk and the A7 A/B because all the wingman had to do was slew the aiming diamond of the heads up display on to the target aim point and then allow the system to release the bombs. As soon as the bombs released, the wingman initiated a turn inside his leader and close to a combat cruise position as prebriefed. If the section leader managed to maintain division integrity, the wingman would fly closer to their leader. If the section was heading to the coast separately, the wingman flew a position further away and slightly aft of abeam the leader so that each pilot could cover the other's six and flank.

The A7 C/E was clearly the superior aircraft for strike, division, and section leaders. The navigation system, and heads up display (HUD) enabled flight leaders to keep their head out of the cockpit and spend more time looking for the target and watching for AAA and SAMs and spend less time navigating.  This was particularly valuable if the division or section had to make a SAM evasive maneuver. In the A7C/E, all the lead pilots had to do was turn the velocity vector toward the desired heading displayed on the HUD. SAM evasive maneuvers could be extremely disorientating and A4 Skyhawk and A7A/B pilots had a greater challenge getting back on course to the target.

The A7A/B/C aircraft with the TF30P408 engine were the most fuel efficient of the aircraft followed by the A7E with the TF-41 engine and lastly the A4 Skyhawk.
Because Alpha Strikes were generally conducted using flex deck operations rather than cyclic ops, the returning strike aircraft had a"ready deck" on arrival. Alpha strike flight times were usually less than an hour in length except for Hanoi strikes which lasted longer. They required fighter and strike aircraft to take on fuel before the strike. It was not uncommon for A4 Skyhawks to return to the carrier from Alpha Strikes will less than a 1000 lbs of fuel remaining. The A7s would return from the same strikes with 1500 to 2000 lbs of fuel. Quite often, the A4s would require to refuel on the way back to the ship to have enough fuel to make a pass at the deck.

Having said that, some of my favorite Alpha Strikes were in 1967 when I was in VA-15 flying A4Cs. For strikes close to the coast such as to the Thanh Hoa bridge or for Haiphong targets, we would go "clean wing" (no fuel tanks or bomb racks) and carry a MK 84 (2000 # bomb) on the centerline and one MK 83 (1000# bomb) on each wing station. When we released all our bombs on one pass, we went from an aircraft that weighed about 17,000# (empty A4C,10,500#s; Bomb load, 4,000 #s, and 2500 #s of fuel or so) and pulled off with an aircraft that weighed 12,500 lbs or so (empty A4C 10,500 #s and 2000#s of fuel or so). After the pullout, the airspeed was 500 knots (kts) or so and we could accelerate to close to 600 kts because the aircraft was "clean". A soon as we were "feet wet" and clear of AAA we would breath a little easier and start a climb making sure we didn't have a SAM at our six. Once clear of the SAM threat, we would trade air speed for altitude and arrive at the ship with about 1,500 #s of fuel for recovery without tanking. If we had less than 1,500#s of fuel, it was time to find a tanker before attempting to land on the ship.

Back to flights recorded in my Logbook

October 25th, 0.6 hours, Combat Tanker (1 point)
                  
Close Air Support (CAS)/Direct Air Support (DAS) missions to South Vietnam usually involved tanking either after the launch or before the recovery.
During these operations a couple of aircraft in each attack squadron
were configured with a inflight refueling store ("Buddy store").


A "Buddy Store" was loaded on one or both of the outboard wing stations (1 or 8). Usually a 2000# fuel tank was  loaded on the inboard stations (2 and 7) which provided an excellent fuel load for tanking services.
Thanks to Ron Brooks for this picture (edited a bit)



October 27th, 2.2 hours, 8 MK 82s,  South Vietnam CAS/DAS I Corps, Covey 80


On October 28th, we apparently flew some missions in Route Packages Three and southern Route Pack Four in North Vietnam

October 28th, 2.1 hours, 6 MK 82s and one AGM 45 Shrike Route Package Three Iron Hand Recce        25th Strike Flight Air Medal


 






Lcdr Jim Hall

VA-86, A7C

KIA, October 28th, 1972

LCDR Jim Hall was on a Route Package Four Iron Hand Recce mission on October 28th, 1972. His aircraft was hit by a surface to air missile about 5 miles west of Thanh Hoa. No parachute was observed by his wingman.

Although only eleven aircraft were shot sown in direct strikes on the Thanh Hoa Bridge,
104 pilots were lost in a 75 square mile area around the bridge on missions not directly involved in a Thanh Hoa Bridge strike on missions such as Jim's Route Package Four Iron Hand mission.  It is likely that Jim was the last pilot lost in the vicinity of Thanh Hoa.

LCDR Hall's remains were returned by the North Vietnamese on March 15th, 2000.


Back to flights recorded in my Logbook

October 29th, 2.1 hours, non combat flight from the America to NAS Cubi Ppoint
October 30th, 2.5 hours, non combat flight at NAS Cubi Point
October 31st, 2.4 hours, non combat flight from NAS Cubi Point to USS America on Yankee Station


November, 1972

  I flew 27 flights in November (54.9 hours); 2 non combat flights and 25 combat missions:  for 304 total combat missions.
I logged 27 carrier landing (22 day, 5 night) for  total of 265 America traps

Sample of Newspaper Articles that came out about this time




  Flights recorded in my Logbook


November1st- 2.1 hours, 8 MK 82s, MERSHIP mission                280th combat mission
Novenber 3rd- 1.9 hours, night recce mission  of some sort; 1.9 hours of night time, 1.5 actual instrument time, night trap

November 4th- 2.3 hours, 8 MK 82s/20mm, Route Pack Two Road Recce
November 5th- 1.9 hours, 8MK 82s, Route Pack Three Recce

November 6th- 2.2 hours, 8 MK 82s, CAS/DAS, South Vietnam, I Corps, FAC Nail 52
November 8th- 2.0 hours, 8 MK 82s, CAS/DAS, South Vietnam, I Corps, FAC Nail 86

November 9th- 2.2 hours, 8 MK 82s, Pave Phantom radar day bombing Ho Chi Minh Trail

You might recall that we flew a few Pave Phantom flights when we first arrived on Yankee Station in July.


                                                                                        
Pave Phantom flights were flights where a flight of two A7s would join up with  a specially configured Air Force F4 Phantom.

Each A7 would fly a loose parade position on each wing of the F4. The Phantom would be radar controlled and bomb release was controlled  from the ground.  The target was usually a suspected NVN base camp along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Navy planes would carry the same type bombs as the Air Force  F4 (usually Mk 82s).  We would release our bombs manually when we saw the bombs release from the F4. The only issue for us  was that we suspected that the Air Force was using a new type of electric fuse which had a bad habit of activating prematurely.  I always briefed my wingman to break up and away from the F4 as soon as our bombs were released (We used manual fuses).

On one of these flights, I was on the left wing of the F4; my wingman was on the right. When we broke up and away from the F4,
his bombs detonated prematurely destroying the aircraft probably killing the pilot and back seater. No PRC-90 transmissions were heard or trace of the pilots were discovered.

Back to Flights recorded in my Logbook Toward the end of Linebacker One, we began to fly a lot more close air support missions in South Vietnam.

Our bomb loads for these close air support missions was usually 8 or 10  MK 82 500# bombs per aircraft.
Thanks to Ron Brooks for this picture (edited a bit)


November 10th- 2.3 hours, 8 MK 82s, CVAS/DAS South Vietnam, I Corps, FAC Covey 117

November 10th- 0.7 hours, combat tanker

November 11th- 1.8 hours, 8 MK 82s, night Pave Phantom, Ho Chi Minh Trail            26th Strike Flight Air Medal
November 12th- 2.2 hours, 8 MK 82s, day Pave Phantom, Route Package One,          290th combat mission

November 13th- 2.0 hours, 8 Mk 82s, CAS, South Vietnam, I Corps, Hue City, FAC, Nail 35
November 14th- 2.2 hours, 8 Mk 82s, CAS, South Vietnam, I Corps, Hue City, FAC Nail 35
November 14th- 2.1 hours, 8 Mk 82s, CAS, South Vietnam, I Corps, Hue City, FAC Tom 21
          
  I was recommended for a Gallantry Cross with Palm for one of these missions at Hue City.




I think the missions on the 13th and 14th of November are examples of missions which were in support of the South Vietnamese Army during the Battle of Hue City.

If so, all three of these flights would have involved Close Air Support in defense of Hue during end of the North Vietnamese Nguyen Hue offensive.

Much of the fighting in Hue City was street to street and house to house.


Back to Flights recorded in my Logbook

November 15th- 2.1 hours, non combat post maintenance test flight

November 15th- 2.1 hours, 8 Mk 82s, 20mm, Cambodia
November 16h- 2.0 hours, 8 Mk 82s, 20mm, South Vietnam, I Corps, Close Air Support (probably troops in contact because of the 20mm), FAC Nail 38

November 18th- 2.5 hours, combat tanker


A fire broke out in the Number Two catapult spaces on board America on November 19th at 14:10.

My room mate , LCDR Snuffy Smith and I were in our stateroom on the port side on the 03 level at the time of the fire. We didn't think much of it initially. But with the  03 level filling with smoke, we evacuated using the port catwalk to the safety of the flight deck. The damage control parties extinguished the fire and clean up and repair work was begun. I don't think that there were any injuries but a quite a few state rooms were damaged and unusable.

Note: A few years later (1976) when I was XO of VA-15 onboard America, may stateroom was directly under the #2 catapult track. Directly above my rack was a plastic bag containing fed hydraulic fluid from a leaky valve; Not very reassuring!


Flight operations started again on November 23rd without the Number Two catapult.
(
America had four catapults; one and two off the bow and 3 and 4 off the angle deck)

The America had no problems supplying the reduced number of combat sorties tasked through the end of November.

Back to Flights recorded in my Logbook

November 23rd- 2.2 hours, 8 Mk 82s, South Vietnam, I Corps, CAS/DAS, FAC Covey 22

November 23rd- 0.6 hours, combat tanker

November 25th- 2.3 hours, 8 Mk 82s, daylight Pave Phantom mission

November 26th- 2.4 hours, combat tanker                            300th combat mission

November 26th- 2.0, 8 Mk 82s, night Pave Phantom mission

November 27th- 2.1 hours, non combat post maintenance test flight

November 27th- 2.3 hours, 8 Mk 82s, South Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh Trail, night Pave Phantom mission            27th Strike Flight Air Medal
November 29th- 2.2 hours, 8 Mk 82s, South Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh Trail, daylight Pave Phantom mission
November 30th- 2.2 hours, 8 Mk 82s, South Vietnam, TACAN drop, Ho Chi Minh Trail

December, 1972

I flew one flight in December (2.0 hours); one combat mission:  for 305 total combat missions. I logged one carrier landing  (one night trap) for  total of 266 America traps


December 1st- 2.0 hours, 8 Mk 82s,
South Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh Trail, night Pave Phantom mission. My last Vietnam combat mission)   305 combat missions



The America entered port in Subic Bay on December 2nd, where the Number Two catapult was repaired.


I left VA-82 in port Subic Bay and returned to Jacksonville.  I was in receipt of orders to the Royal Navy Staff College in Greenwich, England.
  I was due to check in with the Naval Air Attache at the US Embassy in London the first week in January, 1973.
As a result, I missed participating in Operation Linebacker II



America departed Subic Bay on December 8th to return to Yankee Station. America participated in Operation Linebacker Two . Linebacker Two B-52 bombing operations of Hanoi and Haiphong were conducted from December 18th through December 29th when hostilities ceased. America supported Linebacker Two with Anti Sam Iron hand missions, anti MIG BARCAP  missions, and Search and Rescue support operations.


Linebacker Two

(This section is paraphrased from and quoted in part from Wikipedia)
 
However the "Peace is At Hand" did not materialize as the North Vietnamese stalled the negotiations by demanding change after change to the agreement to allow their Nugyen Hue offensive operation in South Vietnam more time to be successful. In December, after returning to Washington from Paris, Henry Kissinger reported to President Nixon  that the North Vietnamese had taken a hard line and were stalling.  President Nixon was furious and immediately wanted to order B-52 strikes against North Vietnam including Hanoi and Haiphong.  However Kissinger convinced him to hold off to give the North Vietnamese one last chance to seriously negotiate peace. On December 14th, Kissinger fired off an ultimatum to Hanoi, threatening "grave consequences" if North Vietnam did return to the negotiating table within 72 hours. The North Vietnamese did not respond. On December 16th, President Nixon ordered the reseeding of North Vietnamese ports with air-dropped naval mines.

President Nixon was working under a strict time table. He understood that Henry Kissinger's "Peace is at Hand" announcement had raised the level of expectation of a negotiated settlement. Nixon knew that the Democratic Party controlled 93rd Congress would go into session on January 3rd and legislate the end of the war.
He wanted to force the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table.

On December 18th, 129 B-52s (87 of them from Guam) attacked targets in Hanoi and Haiphong with 39 support aircraft from the Seventh Air Force, Navy Task Force 77 carrier aircraft and the Marine Corp F-4 fighter escorts, F-105 Wild Weasel iron hand SAM suppression aircraft, Air Force EB-66 and Navy EA-6 radar jamming aircraft, KC-135 refueling capability, and search and rescue aircraft). 68 SAMs were launched. Three B-52s were shot down by SAMs and and five were damaged but managed to return to their bases. An F-111 Ardvark was shot down while on a mission to bomb the broadcasting facilities of Radio Hanoi.

On December 19th, 93 B-52 sorties were flown. This time, only 20 SAMs were launched. There were no B-52s shot down. A number were damaged but all the aircraft returned to their bases. The planners at SAC and Hawaii expected the third night would go well also. But it didn't.

On December 20th, 99 B-52s were sent in. Only 34 SAMs were fired. But 7 B-52s were lost and one heavily damaged B-52 crashed in Thailand attempted to return to its base.

"All hell broke loose" at SAC headquarters and at the USAF staff headquarters in Hawaii (PACAF). If these staffs had asked and considered the tactical level "experts" recommendations at the tactical wing level at Korat and Taklii in Thailand who had been fighting the war in the north since 1965, this "blood bath" could have been avoided! 

President Nixon ordered that the B-52 bombing effort be extended beyond the three days originally planned.

VA-82 would loose a pilot while flying Iron Hand support on December 20th (The third day of Linebacker II)!





LT Tom Weiland

VA-82, A7C

POW, December 20th, 1972

Tom Weiland was flying an Iron Hand mission in the vicinity of Haiphong in support of a B-52 raid to Hanoi. He attacked a SAM site with an AGM 45 Shrike missile but was hit by one of two SAMs fired from another site.

He ejected and landed close to the shoreline south of Haiphong. He attempted to hide but he was quickly captured. He was taken to Haiphong and then to the Hanoi Hilton where he spent two days in solitary confinement. His interrogators wanted to know when and where the B-52s were going to strike.  He couldn't give them that information because regular line pilots were not given plans for future operations.

Tom was a POW for 100 days before he was repatriated in March, 1973.  After a month's rest and recuperation back in the states, Tom rejoined VAS-82 at NSAS Cecil Field. He was the first POW to fly operational aircraft after returning home. However, his stay at VA-82 was a short one. He left the Navy in Sptember, 1973. After a short stint to with the airlines, earned a law degree from Samford University's Cumberland School of Law in Birmingham, Alabama. He practiced industrial law with Markel, McDonough, and O'Neal in Orlando, Florida.

Tom was the victim of an unsolved murder in a hotel in Atlanta, Georgia in 1986.


Jim Brister was flying the Combat Tanker that night and was about 30 miles off the coast when Tom was hit by the SAM.
Although he couldn't see Tom's aircraft, he vividly recalls seeing both SAMs approaching the location of Tom's aircraft.



On December 21st, 30 B-52Ds from U-Tapao air base in Thailand struck Hanoi targets. Two more B-52D models were lost to SAMs.

On December 22nd, 30 B-52 aircraft struck targets in the Haiphong area. No B-52s were lost but an F-111 was shot down.

Two Days before Christmas (December 23rd).
SAC added SAM sites and airfields to the target list. The B-52s avoided Hanoi and hit SAM sites northeast of the city and a railroad yard.  USAF F-111s were sent in before the arrival of the B-52s to suppress SAMs opposition. These flight were so successful that the F-111 mission was SAM suppression for the rest of Linebacker II.

Although the B-52s got most of the press, the F-111s, Air Force Wild Weasels and Navy Iron Hand aircraft flew support for the night time strikes. The Navy and the Marine Corps flew about 100 daytime sorties.

On December 24th (Christmas Eve). 30 B-52s supported by 69 tactical aircraft struck a railroad yard and Kep airfield without any losses.

There was a 36 hour Christmas stand down during which Air Force planners went to work to revise their plans for the next phase of the operation. SAC finally turned over the tactical mission planning to the Eighth Air Force on Guam.. The Eighth Air Force promptly revised the tactics. Instead of using multiple waves flying basically the same route (WW2 tactics), all the bombers (B-52s and F-111s) would be in and out of the target area within 20 minutes and they would approach from multiple directions at different altitudes.

The America left Yankee Station during the Christmas stand down and sailed for Hong Kong!


On December 26th 120 B-52s struck targets at Hanoi and Haiphong (78 in one time block from Anderson AFB in Guam, the largest single combat launch in SAC history while 42 other B-52s came from Thailand). The B-52s were supported by 113 tactical aircraft which provided chaff corridors, escort fighters, Wild Weasel and Navy SAM suppression, and electronic countermeasures support. The North Vietnamese air defense system was overwhelmed by the number of sircraft it had to track in such as short time and by the dense blanket of chaff that had been laid down. 68 SAMs were fired on this m,ission. Only one B-52 was shot down and another was damaged and almost  made it back to U-Tapao where it crashed short of the runway.

On December 27th, 60 B-52s flew the mission. One B-52 was so heavily damaged that it's crew ejected over Laos where it was rescued. Another B-52 wasn't so lucky and took a direct hit over the target. Two F4s and an HH-53 search and rescue helo were also shot down.

On December 28th, 90 B-52s, 60 B-52s from Anderson in Guam and 30 30 B-52s from U-Tapao attacked targets in Hanoi and Haiphong in multiple waves from different directions with out loosing an aircraft!

On December 29th, the final day of Linebacker II, 60 B-52s (30 from U-Tapao and 30 from Anderson attacked targets in the north. An additional 30 B-52s flew Arc Light missions in the panhandle of North Vietnam (Route Package 1 to the DMZ) and in South Vietnam (south of the DMZ). There were no losses on the final night of Linebacker II.

(This section was paraphrased from and quoted in part from Wikipedia)


America left Hong Kong and December 29th, spent some time at Subic Bay in the Philippines for repairs and liberty and then went back to Yankee Station for her last line period.

The peace agreement was signed on January 28th in Paris.


America left Yankee Station about February 15th and arrived in Subic Bay on February 7th, left three days later
and returned to Norfolk arriving on March 24th, 1973




Thanks again to Ron Brooks for this picture (edited a bit)



I would like to thank the following shipmates in VA-82 for their inputs so far for this chapter;
 Ray Thomas, Jim "Rock" Yeager. Charlie Sapp, Jim Kuzmick, Marv Baldwin, Nick Nickens, and Jim Brister.

Establishing contacts during the writing of this chapter has generated interest in a VA-82 Circa 1972 renunion.
As a result, we are planning a reunion in St. Augustine at the Casa Monica Hotel November 9th through the 12th,2021.

VA-82 Reunion Roster Webpage



Ray Thomas
Ray provided significant details about several missions we flew together during the 1972 Vietnam Deployment.

Ray provided the information about the September 20th major strike on the Vinh POL storage facilities.

Ray planned and flew #4 on the October 4th "Pocket Money" mining mission to Hon Gay.

Ray was #4 in our "Alpha Strike" to the Do Xa Bridge near Hanoi on October 6th. 

Ray reminded me of the story about a close air support flight with a Covey FAC we shared together on October 24th or 25th, 1972 where we destroyed Russian built tank with one bomb.

Ray went on from VA-82 to have an illustrious career in the Navy including as CO of the first F/A 18 squadron on the east coast and as a Deputy CAG.  Ray retired as Captain USN (24 years of service)

A special thanks to Ray for all he has done to colorize many black and white images using Photo Shop Essentials software!

Jim "Rock" Yeager




Rock flew in the three plane section (Bob Corey, Rock, Crash Landon) in the September 17th Battle at Mo Duc. He provided valuable information about that mission.

Rock was my wingman on the October 4th "Pocket Money" mining mission near Non Gay including our attack on the North Vietnamese boat in Haiphong Harbor.

Rock flew my wing when I lead the "Alpha Strike" on the Do Xa Bridge near Hanoi on October 6th. He survived the slavo of three SASMs fired at our section so was able to provide important details of that mission that I had forgotten!



Charlie Sapp


Charlie was especially helpful in sorting out the sequence of events in the Battle of Mo Duc on September 17th, 1972.

Also, I learned a great deal from Charlie about VAL-4 OVG-10 close air support operations in the Mekong Delta.  I enjoyed reading "Flying Black Ponies". Not only was it an exciting and entertaining book but, I learned a great deal about the war in the Mekong Delta.

Charlie flew as the Section leader (#3) in my division for the October 4th "Pocket Money" mining mission to Hon Gay.


Jim Kuzmick

Jim reminded me of the infamous night on August 20th when we took 4 MK 82s and 2 MK 20 Rockeyes each to evaluate the capability of the A7C as a terrrain following low altitude night bomber in Route Package 6B.
We knew before we launched that we were not trained for the mission and that the single seat A7 wa not up to the task. So, we turned it into a standard night Route Pack Six night road recce. After three SAMs (two of which were aimed at us), we expended our bombs and Rockeyes on alternate targets and returned to the ship.


Jim flew in the third VA-82 section that was involved in the Battle of Mo Duc on September 17th, 1972. He provided valuable information about that mission including the RESCAP operations involved when the Covey 111 OV-10 crew had to eject as a result of battler damage.



Marv Baldwin


Marv provided me details about the October 6th, Thanh Hoa Bridge strike on which his Walleye was confirmed to have scored a direct hit on the center suppport structure resulting in the collapse of the center span of the bridge.

Marv also gave me details on which missions we flew together during the 1972 Vietnam Deployment.

Nick Nickens




Nick provided a great description of the exciting trip our maintenance personnel made to DaNang to "salvage" parts from our damaged A7 that was unflyable due to a landing mishap in September after the Mo Duc mission.


Golden Eagles in VA-82
 
Four pilots in VA-82 on the 1972 WESTPAC deployment who have been selected for membership in the Golden Eagles.


Captain Tom Scott USN Ret.


VA-195  (1965)  USS Bonhome Richard * Vietnam
VA-113  (1966-1967)  USS Kittyhawk  * Vietnam
CTF-77   (1969-1970)  USS Constellation/USS Kittyhawk * Vietnam
VA-82 CO (1971-1972) USS America * Vietnam
CAG 17  USS Forrestal  (1974-1979)
USS Coranado  LPFD-11 CO  (1977-1979)
USS Peleliu  LHA-5  CO (1979-1982



4,255 flight hours    925 traps
4 Vietnam tours   225 combat missions
2 DFCs,  23 Air Medals,  Bronze Star


Rear Admiral Jerry Breast
USN Ret.
VA-66  (1959-1963), USS Intrepid and USS Enterprise- two
                                                                 deployments each
VX-5 China Lake  (1964-1967)  Walleye test
VSA-163  USS Oriskany (1967) A4D  * Vietnam
              USS Oriskany (1968-1970)  *Vietnam
Navy Test Pilot Patuxent River  (1969-1972)
VA-82 CO  USS America  (1972-1973)  *Vietnam
USS America OPS/XO  (1975-1977)
USS Savannah  OR-4  CO  (1979-1981)
USS Independence  CV-62  CO  (1981-1983)
Commander Carrier Group 2  USS Coral Sea  (1985-1987)
US Space Command   Operations  (1987-1990)
 
Total Flight Hours- 3,800   Traps- 998
Vietnam tours- 3    Combat missions- 336

Silver Star
3 DFCs,   6 individual and 21 Strike Flight Air Medals

Admiral Leighton "Snuffy" Smith USN Ret.
VA-81    (1965-1966)   *Vietnam
VA-22  (1966-1968)  *Vietnam
NAVPRO Dallas, Production Test Piloot  A7C/D/E  (1968-1970)
VA-82  (1971-1973)  USS America CV-66  *Vietnam
VA-86  CO  (1975-1977)
CAG-15  (1977-1978)
Commander Light Attack Wing One  (1980-1981)
USS Kalamazoo  AOR-6  CO  (1983-1984)
USS America CV-66  CO  (1984-1985)
Commander Battle Group Six  (1988-1989)

CINCUSNAVEUR/CINCAVSOUTH  (1994-1995)
      Directed NATO air strikes in support of UN forces in Bosnia
COMINFOR (1995-1996) Planned and led NATO's first ever out of area ground  operations as Commander Implementation Force (COMINFOR)


4,225 flight hours   1,035 traps
3 Vietnam combat tours  282 combat missions

2 DFCs,  4 individual and 25 Strike Flight Air Medals

Captain Robert S. "Bo" Smith USN Ret.


VA-15  USS Intrepid CV-11  A4B  (1966)  *Vietnam  110 missions
VA-15  USS Intrepid CV-11  A4C  (1967)  *Vietnam  93 missions
USAF Exchange, 23rd Tactical Fighter Wing, (1968-1970) F-105 Thuderchief
VA-82 USS America CV-66 A7E (1971 Med Cruise)
VA-82 USS America CV-66 A7C (1972) *Vietnam  105 missions
Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell, England (1973-1974)
COMNAVAIRLANT A7 Class Desk/Aide and Flag Lt (1974-1976)
VA-15  XO/CO (1976-1979) A7E Med Cruise Won Battle "E" as CO
COMTHIRDFLT, Pearl Harbor Hawaii (1979-1976) Air Warfare Tng
VA-174 RAG CO  (1980-1982) A7B/C/E  TA7
USS Saratoga CV-60 XO (1983-1985) Med Cruise
USS Austin LPD-4  CO  (1985-1987) 2 Med deployments
COMCRDESGR 12  COS (1988-1989)  USS Eisenhower Med Cruise
COMFIRWESTPAC OPS (1989-1991)  Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990)

4,292 flight hours,    980 traps
3 Vietnam deployments,    305 combat missions
2 DFCs, 2 individual and 27 Strike Flight Air Medals
9 NCMs with Combat V, 2 NAMs with Combat V

I have nominated Ray Thomas for selection as a Golden Eagle.


Next Chapter: Royal Air Force Staff College


Website Created and Updated by Robert S. "Bo" Smith